Skills/npm/pi-code

pi-code@1.7.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Claude Code experience for the pi coding agent: reads your .claude config (rules, commands, skills, hooks, output styles, MCP servers, agents) and adds todo, checkpoints, memory, web, subagents, and goals" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher ilovepixelart · publishing for 117 daysInstalls 7,767Last detonated 7d ago
$claude mcp add pi-code -- npx -y pi-code
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandextensions/status-line.ts:383 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskillInflight = killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandextensions/hooks/runners.ts:63 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes/** Above 2^31-1 ms Node clamps a timer to 1ms, which would kill the hook instantly. */Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandextensions/hooks/runners.ts:150 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes* `onChild` hands the caller a kill for the spawned tree, so a background hook that isFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsextensions/context-imports.ts:42 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* ~/.ssh, ../.. traversal, symlinks) is ignored, so a hostile CLAUDE.md, or aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsextensions/hooks/matcher.ts:225 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// `if: Edit(~/.ssh/*)` guard miss the very call it names. The value is normalisedFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsextensions/context-imports.ts:309 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* repo's `CLAUDE.md` cannot read `~/.claude` (`.credentials.json`, global settings, everyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandextensions/hooks/index.ts:339 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes* next turn, shown to nobody else. A timeout kill discards the output, like aFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandextensions/hooks/index.ts:387 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill = registeredFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandextensions/internal/process-tree.ts:26 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// A child that never spawned has no pid and no group; the direct kill is all there is.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandextensions/internal/process-tree.ts:17 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// there is no pid to hand it, the direct kill with the requested signal is allFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandextensions/subagent/background.ts:61 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes/** Claude's maxTurns: kill the child once it has produced this many turns. */Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandextensions/internal/atomic-write.ts:34 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions* the chmod then makes it exact where the umask took bits away. */Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandextensions/hooks/runners.ts:4 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes* the process-group kill used by the shell runner.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandextensions/hooks/index.ts:930 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif (ctx.hasUI !== true) for (const kill of backgroundKills) kill()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandextensions/hooks/runners.ts:157 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// timeout can kill the descendants too. CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR is Claude's documented way for a hook toFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagepackage.json:42 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"biome:fix": "npx --no-install @biomejs/biome check --write .",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesextensions/subagent/child.ts:75 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file* directory, read/write/curation instructions, and its MEMORY.md capped like theFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagepackage.json:41 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"biome": "npx --no-install @biomejs/biome check",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesextensions/init.ts:66 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction fileparts.push('Write the result to AGENTS.md at the project root. Create the file yourself. pi prefers AGENTS.md over CLAUDE.md as its context file, and Claude Code can read it too via an @AGENTS.md impoFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commandextensions/subagent/child.ts:94 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes* of auto memory, so the same settings chain and env kill switch gate it. */Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandextensions/subagent/background.ts:332 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// slot with no kill and no eviction for the life of the process.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandextensions/subagent/background.ts:384 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesrun.kill = undefinedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandextensions/subagent/background.ts:171 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesrun.kill = undefinedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandextensions/subagent/background.ts:345 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesrun.kill = () => {Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagepackage.json:47 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"knip": "npx --no-install knip"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈74 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for pi-code@1.7.0 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

pi-code@1.7.0 safety verdict: Verified (install only) — KillerSkills