Skills/npm/pcbway-mcp-server

pcbway-mcp-server@0.1.29

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "PCBWay MCP server for AI coding assistants — PCBWay API tools for instant PCB manufacturing quotes, SMT assembly pricing, order management, and shipping costs." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher singlebarrellabs · publishing for 149 daysInstalls 5,418Last detonated 16 h ago
$claude mcp add pcbway-mcp-server -- npx -y pcbway-mcp-server
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Coverage

Started with a decoy PCBWAY_API_KEY; tool list observed. Tool calls with a real credential not tested.
Tested
server startup with a tagged decoy in PCBWAY_API_KEY · MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · where the decoy credential went · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with a real credential
Needs
PCBWAY_API_KEY — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PCBWAY_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: PCBWAY_BASE_DELAY_MS, PCBWAY_BASE_URL, PCBWAY_MAX_RETRIES, PCBWAY_TIMEOUT_MS
Where it talks to
pcbway.com (its own)
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with a real credential

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for PCBWAY_API_KEY and talks to pcbway.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind.

$vet-skills run --secrets PCBWAY_API_KEY=pcbway.com -- npx -y pcbway-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.1.27

vet-skills diff pcbway-mcp-server 0.1.27 0.1.29

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.1.27 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 53 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
13sprocessdependency install exit 0
33sprocessrelaunched with a decoy PCBWAY_API_KEY (tagged; nothing real)
53sclaimed16 tools with a decoy PCBWAY_API_KEY: pcb_quote, smt_quote, order_process, order_details, shipping_freight, account_balance, place_order, confirm_order, cancel_order, check_tgroup_order, pay_tgroup_order, cancel_tgroup_order, check_group_order, get_countries, get_states, get_cities
53stoolscb22f71151f92992
53stools6bd0a8b5271fbc35
53stools9111ba59311709e9
53stoolsa7e997fc65b70e9e
53stools13a849b23bddc06d
53stools391717f142200eda
53stools8f2875971e43d9ec
53stoolse51fe827ead35518
53stoolsb2758acbf878ae1d
53stoolsd05fe31fd56b615c
53stoolsdfb0ab3167f8bd00
53stools82b68ec7b7661177
53stoolsbce70e5f0d79d5f0
53stoolse6383032ed819cb8
53stools1484b43ea57a844a
53stools416b5282bf65fa82
53sprocessscript backend runs setup only
53sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.d.ts:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* Loads .env file automatically via dotenv (if present).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/index.js:97 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx pcbway-mcp-serverFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.js:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* Loads .env file automatically via dotenv (if present).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈79 tok
1 file · 48 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈2,393 tok
16 tools · 150 per tool
Handshake
619 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 47

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for pcbway-mcp-server@0.1.29 as of 16 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

pcbway-mcp-server@0.1.29 safety verdict: Verified — KillerSkills