paperless-mcp@1.6.1
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for Paperless-ngx: documents, organization, saved views, users, workflows, and optional semantic search." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
- Needs
- PAPERLESS_TOKEN — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MCP_OAUTH_ISSUERMCP_OAUTH_STATE_KEYMIN_SECRET_LENGTHOPENAI_API_KEYPAPERLESS_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: EMBEDDING_DIMENSIONS, EMBEDDING_MODEL, EMBEDDING_PROVIDER, EMBEDDINGS_ENABLED, MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, MCP_TRANSPORT, OLLAMA_URL, PAPERLESS_API_VERSION, PAPERLESS_DISABLED_TOOLS, PAPERLESS_MAX_RETRIES, PAPERLESS_MCP_DATA, PAPERLESS_READ_ONLY, PAPERLESS_TIMEOUT_MS, PAPERLESS_TOOLSETS, PAPERLESS_URL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MCP_OAUTH_ISSUER, MCP_OAUTH_STATE_KEY, MIN_SECRET_LENGTH, OPENAI_API_KEY, PAPERLESS_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed (it asks for PAPERLESS_TOKEN); the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 56 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
No findings across 4,974 lines in 27 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @orellbuehler/paperless-mcp@1.6.1 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.