Skills/npm/ottofiles-mcp

ottofiles-mcp@1.2.1

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for OttoFiles — read tools over the gateway with interactive login" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher carbonaitech · publishing for 37 daysInstalls 1,075Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add ottofiles-mcp -- npx -y @carbonaitech/ottofiles-mcp
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OTTOFILES_AUTH_MODEOTTOFILES_CLIENT_SECRETOTTOFILES_INTROSPECTION_CLIENT_SECRETOTTOFILES_TOKEN_CACHEConfiguration, not credentials: OTTOFILES_ADVERTISED_SCOPES, OTTOFILES_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, OTTOFILES_DOWNLOAD_ROOTS, OTTOFILES_ENV_FILE, OTTOFILES_EXPORT_POLL_ATTEMPTS, OTTOFILES_EXPORT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS, OTTOFILES_GATEWAY_URL, OTTOFILES_INTROSPECTION_CLIENT_ID, OTTOFILES_INTROSPECTION_EXPECTED_CLIENT_ID, OTTOFILES_ISSUER, OTTOFILES_MAX_INTROSPECTIONS, OTTOFILES_MCP_SCOPE, OTTOFILES_PREVIEW_TTL_SECONDS, OTTOFILES_REDIRECT_PORT, OTTOFILES_RESOURCE, OTTOFILES_SCOPES, OTTOFILES_UPLOAD_ROOTS
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso carbonai.ca, lukla.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names carbonai.ca, lukla.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OTTOFILES_AUTH_MODE, OTTOFILES_CLIENT_SECRET, OTTOFILES_INTROSPECTION_CLIENT_SECRET, OTTOFILES_TOKEN_CACHE only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @carbonaitech/ottofiles-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 26 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
5.3sprocessdependency install exit 0
25sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · at ModuleJob.run (node:internal/modules/esm/module_job:343:25) at process.processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:103:5) at async onImport.tracePromise.__proto__ (node:internal/modules/esm/loader:681:26) at async asyncRunEntryPointWithESMLoader (node:internal/modules/run_main:117:5)
25sprocessscript backend runs setup only
25sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.js:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Load ONLY from the package root (dist/../.env), NEVER process.cwd(). The MCPFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.js:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Minimal .env loader (no dependency). Values already present in the realFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.js:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// host spawns this server with cwd = the user's current project dir, so a `.env`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.js:6 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// stays authoritative, and .env only fills the gaps for local `npm run dev` /Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.js:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst candidates = explicit ? [explicit] : [join(here, "..", ".env")];Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈64 tok
1 file · 52 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @carbonaitech/ottofiles-mcp@1.2.1 as of 38 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

ottofiles-mcp@1.2.1 safety verdict: Verified (startup only) — KillerSkills