Skills/npm/nephis-mcp-server

nephis-mcp-server@1.0.7

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol (MCP) Server for NEPHIS: Sub-6ms MicroVM Sandboxes, Zero-Copy Database Branching, and Execution Fabric for AI Coding Agents" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher mohitrajdeo · publishing for 4 daysInstalls 1,360Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CIEL_API_KEYNEPHIS_API_KEYTHANATON_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: CIEL_BASE_URL, CIEL_EMAIL, CIEL_NAME, ESCHATON_API_URL, MNEMON_API_URL, NEPHIS_API_URL, NEPHIS_BASE_URL, NEPHIS_DEVELOPER_EMAIL, NEPHIS_DEVELOPER_NAME, NEPHIS_EMAIL, NEPHIS_NAME, THANATON_API_URL
Where it talks to
theeducode.com (its own)
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for CIEL_API_KEY, NEPHIS_API_KEY, THANATON_API_KEY and talks to theeducode.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind.

$vet-skills run --secrets CIEL_API_KEY=theeducode.com,NEPHIS_API_KEY=theeducode.com,THANATON_API_KEY=theeducode.com -- npx -y nephis-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Host or command assembled from base64 fragments. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 26 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
5.4sprocessdependency install exit 0
25sclaimed75 tools: thanaton_exec_command, thanaton_run_code, thanaton_spawn_sandbox, thanaton_list_sandboxes, thanaton_wake_sandbox, thanaton_sleep_sandbox, thanaton_destroy_sandbox, thanaton_list_projects, thanaton_create_project, thanaton_deploy_code, thanaton_get_logs, thanaton_manage_env, thanaton_rollback, thanaton_promote, thanaton_configure_waf, thanaton_configure_scaling, mnemon_list_tenants, mnemon_create_branch, mnemon_promote_branch, mnemon_merge_branch, mnemon_reset_branch, mnemon_diff_branch, mnemon_execute_sql, mnemon_get_schema, mnemon_configure_scaling
25stools3ad5440c4d9664c6
25stools3ed717bf822e267b
25stools74595d032761e15e
25stoolsd71017268497e4d7
25stoolsa80f4fc5764d61cb
25stools0a38dc1f451cc76e
25stoolsb403428491fe834d
25stoolsdc724ff564203d30
25stools24c995cdb52f0c8b
25stools5a243e2479856955
25stoolsa31d86d754f62ed9
25stoolsa13bb09341accef4
25stools2629f2d765d749c4
25stoolsbfad450c26f4fbd1
25stools072440b67d673688
25stools4f3a5d8f5ea793b7
25stools5899d3cbfac21ee9
25stools61c31fac65f0a83d
25stools388615dd3f33f121
25stoolsb17796ce92851f8e
25stoolse23b07b44d4d0ab2
25stools65b3bfe56dc7271d
25stools44f5fa989b045b7b
25stools1cc729a18c79b809
25stools7c560e74d9d8aa43
25stools1810bb5cc0697fae
25stoolsdea8e17a6ad9df2a
25stoolsc09b9374efb34c8c
25stools3caad1096f4132dc
25stoolsb1688265564bb215
25stools09644a41e4585e79
25stools52d10bcbbcad0913
25stoolsb3f3c2241cae98bc
25stools426db9c9cb3684ae
25stools4d91c77deb61e90c
25stoolsc41feb63c61a7bf9
25stools9f1e3018c88d94d4
25stools70357accaa3c2da5
25stools005e35abaeef6644
25stools29316957a5dc554b
25stools5e68397b765fe118
25stools586430a68c44566f
25stoolsa5943dd443d584a7
25stools898c8d112776f9bb
25stoolsdde3f18efa5379af
25stools2beaef42ad9d8e21
25stools9ed5cbbad63b10d7
25stools6f3aabce02723e92
25stools07b059918690b7ec
25stools5ebe4fd2ba4e071b
25stools238066add60bc305
25stools19b029171266771a
25stools4215deb7620344ed
25stoolsbd5a7b4314066756
25stoolsfbec8adc8e290697
25stoolsc36a256256eba138
25stools240ab73610efaa56
25stools24493da0fc2e92fd
25stools2881ec6950749b7d
25stoolsd1e5a131e3711511
25stools3cafe33e5a0fddfb
25stools25c790561326953b
25stoolsed162f1e37a1ee2b
25stoolsc3a885ea6761db02
25stools7cca2c231de873ee
25stoolsd268f45631209d6b
25stoolsb8a6cece99647a34
25stools210a7075eefb04bf
25stoolse8109adfa0c70c02
25stools1ffd0ad834a89c98
25stools98f15c1129d231c4
25stools709c68684f67ed0c
25stools095195d09c1c43c9
25stools1b7dc52fd702155d
25stools3a184af3fa5a3dfb
25sprocessscript backend runs setup only
25sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/index.js:1538 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted coderunnerCmd = `npx -y tsx -e "eval(Buffer.from('${b64}', 'base64').toString('utf-8'))"`;Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/index.js:1329 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesoutput_filename: { type: "string", default: "output.txt", description: "Expected output file to read and grade" },Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/index.js:1327 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesinput_filename: { type: "string", default: "input.txt", description: "Input file name to seed" },Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Host or command assembled from base64 fragmentsdist/index.js:1542 · Host or command assembled from base64 fragmentsrunnerCmd = `echo '${b64}' | base64 -d | bash`;Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈75 tok
1 file · 8 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈9,271 tok
75 tools · 124 per tool
Handshake
877 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 112

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for nephis-mcp-server@1.0.7 as of 38 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mohitrajdeo: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Obfuscated code≈ +5 on the totalRemove base64-assembled strings, eval of decoded text and minified blobs. Reviewers and scanners both treat unreadable code as hostile.
  3. Host or command assembled from base64 fragments≈ +4 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim mohitrajdeoPropose a patch to the maintainer