mware-mcp-server@0.9.3-36b4443
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "MCP server for mware" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
TOOL_CALLS_DATABASE_URLTOOL_CALLS_PGPASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_PORT, MCP_TRANSPORT, MWARE_TIMEOUT_MS, TOOL_CALLS_PGDATABASE, TOOL_CALLS_PGHOST, TOOL_CALLS_PGPORT, TOOL_CALLS_PGSSL, TOOL_CALLS_PGUSER, TOOL_LOG, TOOL_RESULT_MAX_BYTES- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for TOOL_CALLS_DATABASE_URL, TOOL_CALLS_PGPASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 0.9.3-35fcebf
vet-skills diff mware-mcp-server 0.9.3-35fcebf 0.9.3-36b4443In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.9.3-35fcebf did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 28 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
".env.example"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* vars should include `/api` (see .env.example).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.console.error(`mware-mcp-server running (http) on port ${port}`);Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @crscreditapi/mware-mcp-server@0.9.3-36b4443 as of 33 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.