ms-365-mcp-server@0.184.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: " A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for interacting with Microsoft 365 and Office services through the Graph API" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MS365_MCP_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_DISCOVERYMS365_MCP_CLIENT_SECRETMS365_MCP_FEDERATED_TOKEN_FILEMS365_MCP_OAUTH_TOKENMS365_MCP_PKCE_SECRETMS365_MCP_TOKEN_CACHE_PATHMS365_MCP_TRUST_PROXY_AUTHPKCE_SECRET_MIN_LENGTHor--trust-proxy-auth/--enable-auth-tools/--allow-unauthenticated-discoveryConfiguration, not credentials: CACHE_KEY_BYTES, ENABLED_TOOLS, ENABLED_TOOLS_FILE, MS365_MCP_ALLOW_PAGINATION, MS365_MCP_ALLOWED_REDIRECT_URIS, MS365_MCP_ALLOWED_SCOPES, MS365_MCP_APP_MODE, MS365_MCP_ATTACHMENT_HOST, MS365_MCP_ATTACHMENT_PORT, MS365_MCP_ATTACHMENT_URL_BASE, MS365_MCP_ATTACHMENT_URL_KEY, MS365_MCP_ATTACHMENT_URL_KEY_FILE, MS365_MCP_ATTACHMENT_URL_KEY_ID, MS365_MCP_ATTACHMENT_URL_TTL_S, MS365_MCP_AUDIT_LOG, MS365_MCP_BASE_URL, MS365_MCP_BLOB_MAX_BYTES, MS365_MCP_BLOB_OUTPUT, MS365_MCP_BODY_FORMAT, MS365_MCP_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_PATH, MS365_MCP_CLIENT_ID, MS365_MCP_CLOUD_TYPE, MS365_MCP_CORS_ORIGIN, MS365_MCP_DISABLE_DCR, MS365_MCP_EAGER_TOOLS, MS365_MCP_EXPECTED_HOME_ACCOUNT_ID, MS365_MCP_EXPECTED_USERNAME, MS365_MCP_EXTRA_SCOPES, MS365_MCP_FORCE_WORK_SCOPES, MS365_MCP_GRAPH_CIRCUIT_DISABLED, MS365_MCP_HTTP_LOCAL_FILE_TOOLS, MS365_MCP_KEYVAULT_URL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso microsoft.com, githubusercontent.com, microsoftonline.com, azure.com, chinacloudapi.cn, azure.cn, microsoftonline.us, microsoft.us, azure.us, graph.invalid — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names microsoft.com, githubusercontent.com, microsoftonline.com, azure.com, chinacloudapi.cn, azure.cn, microsoftonline.us, microsoft.us, azure.us, graph.invalid as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MS365_MCP_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_DISCOVERY, MS365_MCP_CLIENT_SECRET, MS365_MCP_FEDERATED_TOKEN_FILE, MS365_MCP_OAUTH_TOKEN, MS365_MCP_PKCE_SECRET, MS365_MCP_TOKEN_CACHE_PATH, MS365_MCP_TRUST_PROXY_AUTH, PKCE_SECRET_MIN_LENGTH only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 18 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
// Microsoft's published OpenAPI metadata (e.g. range(address='{address}')/formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.it("honors endpoints.json contentType override on binary uploads", async () => {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.…console.error( `[ms365-mcp] Ignored ${ignoredOwn.length} variable(s) from .env: ${[...ignoredOwn].sort().join(", ")}. Only ${ENV_FILE_ALLOWLIST.join(", ")} ar…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const PYTHON_WHITESPACE = " \n\v\f\r \x85\xA0\u1680\u2000\u2001\u2002\u2003\u2004\u2005\u2006\u2007\u2008\u2009\u200A\u2028\u2029\u202F\u205F\u3000";Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.`npx -y openapi-zod-client "${openapiTrimmedFile}" -o "${clientFilePath}" --with-description --strict-objects --additional-props-default-value=false`,Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.secrets.clientSecret && "a client secret (MS365_MCP_CLIENT_SECRET, .env or Key Vault)",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.RUN chown -R node:node /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.console.log(`Created directory: ${outputDir}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.const file = options.path ?? path.resolve(process.cwd(), ".env");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…u05D1\u05E8\u05D4|\u0625\u0639\u0627\u062F\u0629 \u062A\u0648\u062C\u064A\u0647|\u0BAE\u0BC1\u0BA9\u0BCD\u0BA9\u0BA9\u0BC1\u0BAA\u0BCD\u0BAA\u0BC1)\\s*[:\uFF1A]", "iu" ); function isForwardSubject(subject) { return FORWARD…Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @softeria/ms-365-mcp-server@0.184.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim softeria: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- Unicode escape sequence detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.