Skills/npm/motion-skills

motion-skills@0.1.8

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "The engine behind Motion Skills: your coding agent writes the film, scores it, and you point at the frame to change it." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher hideewsj · publishing for 24 daysInstalls 1,995Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 67 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 0.1.6

vet-skills diff motion-skills 0.1.6 0.1.8

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.1.6 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.7sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.7sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.8sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.9sprocess8 of 67 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.9sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.9sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.9sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actioncli/lib/cut.js:227 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data fileslines.push('', 'Check the plan, then `mo cut <file> --render`. Edit `plan.json` (`keep` is in source seconds) to put a cut back; a deliberate pause goes in `keep` as it is.');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagecli/lib/export.js:263 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code<code>npx serve .</code>Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagecli/lib/export.js:287 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code<div class="code cmd"><pre id="skill">npx skills add ${esc(SKILL)}</pre><button class="copy" data-copy="skill"></button></div>Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagecli/lib/export.js:288 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code<div class="code cmd"><pre id="demo">npx motion-skills demo</pre><button class="copy" data-copy="demo"></button></div>Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellcli/lib/audit.js:24 · Remote installer piped to shell// A pipe inside a Markdown table cell is written \| (a command like `curl … | bash`); match it as the plain pipe.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandcli/lib/cdp.js:32 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// Ctrl-C or a kill does not run 'exit' handlers: what must not be left behind (browsers, temp profiles, a render'sFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterncli/lib/audit.js:24 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code// A pipe inside a Markdown table cell is written \| (a command like `curl … | bash`); match it as the plain pipe.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscli/lib/export.js:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Dot-files and dot-folders never ship (.env, .claude/, .git/…): the share page and its source.zip are public.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actioncli/lib/export.js:123 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesfor (const f of ['Inter-var.woff', 'NotoSansSC-500.woff', 'OFL.txt']) put(`fonts/${f}`, readFileSync(join(PKG, 'fonts', f)));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagecli/lib/export.js:302 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codezh: { copy: '复制', copied: '已复制', prompt: (t, url) => '用 motion-skills 复刻这部片:《' + t + '》。\\n源码:' + url + '(下载解压后运行 \`npx motion-skills studio ' + D.name + '\`,我边看边指着画面改)。\\n保留好的部分,把它改成:' },Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
HTML that renders invisible but is read by the agentstudio/index.html:49 · HTML that renders invisible but is read by the agent · informational: not an instruction file<div data-zh="还没有 Agent 在接单。在你的 Agent 里说「处理 motion-skills 的评论」,或在终端运行:">No agent is picking up comments yet. Tell your agent "handle the motion-skills comments"Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagecli/lib/export.js:301 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code…n-skills: "' + t + '".\\nSource: ' + url + ' (download and unzip it, then run \`npx motion-skills studio ' + D.name + '\` so I can watch and point at the frame while you work).\…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagecli/mo.js:561 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codereturn out(`${r.dir}\n index.html open it, or put the folder on any static host (GitHub Pages, Vercel, npx serve)\n source.zip ${r.files.length} files — unzip and run mo studio ${r.name}`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈56 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for motion-skills@0.1.8 as of 7 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim hideewsj: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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