Skills/npm/mkt-agentic-sdlc-skill

mkt-agentic-sdlc-skill@0.31.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Evidence-First marketing planning protocol for Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Google Antigravity and Codex: engagement triage, SOSTAC workflow, evidence ledger, mechanical validator and optional devPNT integration." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher antoneeo · publishing for 211 daysInstalls 4,231Last detonated 4d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; Hidden zero-width characters detected; Hidden zero-width characters detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset

Static findings

CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentREADME.md:6 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentgenerated by scripts/whats_new.js from distributions/mkt-agentic-sdlc/CHANGELOG.md: edit the CHANGELOG, then run node scripts/whats_new.js --writeFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/scripts/sdlc_core.py:614 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(["git", "rev-parse", "--short=12", "HEAD"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/scripts/sdlc_core.py:640 · Python subprocess execution detectedr2 = subprocess.run(["git", "ls-files", "--others", "--exclude-standard", "--", rel_path],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedskills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/docs_site/app.js:59 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contents = s.replace(/[­​-‏⁠-⁤]/g, "");Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedskills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/scripts/docs_site.py:62 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentINVISIBLE = re.compile("[­​-‏⁠-⁤]")Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/scripts/sdlc_core.py:635 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(["git", "diff", "--name-only", ref, "--", rel_path],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/postinstall.js:85 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconsole.log('👉 npx mkt-sdlc-init');Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/scripts/sdlc_core.py:625 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(["git", "status", "--porcelain", "--", rel],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/scripts/sdlc_core.py:605 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(["git", "rev-parse", "--is-inside-work-tree"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/scripts/docs_site.py:1369 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(["git", "check-ignore", "-q", str(out)], cwd=str(project),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/init.js:55 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeif npm blocks scripts, run \`npx mkt-sdlc-install-skill\`).Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commandskills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/scripts/knowledge.py:3300 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# router: a router throw must not kill this line. It measures NOTESFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandskills/mkt-agentic-sdlc/SKILL.md:127 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes… artifact — swap test on positioning, untraced numbers, orphan tactics, missing kill criteria. Findings are answered one by one; cap 3 rounds, then surface open find…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈6,000 tok
1 file · 31 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @antoneeo/mkt-agentic-sdlc-skill@0.31.0 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim antoneeo: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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