Skills/npm/mikrotik-mcp

mikrotik-mcp@0.1.0

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "MikroTik RouterOS v7 Model Context Protocol (MCP) Server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher reyhanfahlevi · publishing for 8 daysInstalls 415Last detonated 36 min ago
$claude mcp add mikrotik-mcp -- npx -y @reyhanfahlevi/mikrotik-mcp
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Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MIKROTIK_PASSWORDMIKROTIK_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZEDConfiguration, not credentials: MIKROTIK_ALLOW_INSECURE_SSL, MIKROTIK_HOST, MIKROTIK_PASS, MIKROTIK_PORT, MIKROTIK_TIMEOUT, MIKROTIK_USE_SSL, MIKROTIK_USER, MIKROTIK_USERNAME
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MIKROTIK_PASSWORD, MIKROTIK_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @reyhanfahlevi/mikrotik-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 27 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
6.4sprocessdependency install exit 0
26sclaimed12 tools: mikrotik_get_system_resource, mikrotik_get_system_routerboard, mikrotik_get_system_identity, mikrotik_list_interfaces, mikrotik_get_interface_details, mikrotik_get_ip_addresses, mikrotik_get_ip_routes, mikrotik_get_arp_table, mikrotik_get_dhcp_leases, mikrotik_get_firewall_filter_rules, mikrotik_get_firewall_nat_rules, mikrotik_get_system_logs
26stools75b7e616f426c242
26stools7b190c86998f1e05
26stools777507848859dd3a
26stoolsee13c1d028a08162
26stools3b5776405fbb0805
26stools1a88bba27b01780a
26stools337a10bc1c842187
26stools259f8326c70ee886
26stoolsecbe309284e141ec
26stoolsa5ca5d1b6dceeacc
26stoolsebaf92723d1fb037
26stools204985087c83f8d5
26sprocessscript backend runs setup only
26sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.js:2 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Try loading .env file if it exists (Node 20+)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.js:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Ignore if .env doesn't existFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈54 tok
1 file · 24 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈1,006 tok
12 tools · 84 per tool
Handshake
441 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 79

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.