Skills/npm/meshy-mcp-server

meshy-mcp-server@0.6.12

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Meshy AI 3D generation platform" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher meshy-ai · publishing for 228 daysInstalls 103KLast detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add meshy-mcp-server -- npx -y @meshy-ai/meshy-mcp-server
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Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
INVALID_API_KEY_MESSAGEMESHY_API_KEYMISSING_API_KEY_MESSAGEConfiguration, not credentials: CHARACTER_LIMIT, MESHY_API_HOST, MESHY_CLIENT, ProgramFiles, TRANSPORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso meshy.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names meshy.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects INVALID_API_KEY_MESSAGE, MESHY_API_KEY, MISSING_API_KEY_MESSAGE only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @meshy-ai/meshy-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.6.11

vet-skills diff meshy-mcp-server 0.6.11 0.6.12

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.6.11 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

Only one of the two runs produced a tool list; tools are not compared.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 30 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
9.8sprocessdependency install exit 0
30sclaimed28 tools: meshy_text_to_3d, meshy_image_to_3d, meshy_text_to_3d_refine, meshy_multi_image_to_3d, meshy_get_task_status, meshy_list_tasks, meshy_cancel_task, meshy_download_model, meshy_list_models, meshy_remesh, meshy_retexture, meshy_rig, meshy_animate, meshy_text_to_motion, meshy_list_animations, meshy_convert, meshy_resize, meshy_uv_unwrap, meshy_text_to_image, meshy_image_to_image, meshy_send_to_slicer, meshy_analyze_printability, meshy_repair_printability, meshy_process_multicolor, meshy_auto_split
30stools17ba0179a04775e1
30stoolsa3af9020d1311279
30stools2f6af95e75f47ec1
30stools53656afe048b50c0
30stools028993f41d839160
30stools3d1863a4b77bc46b
30stools011eceaf2ece1bf7
30stoolsc6ae1de4f436322c
30stoolsfd3ce35be6dfa652
30stools59f1a56f934f1861
30stools1b94096c6d804e6a
30stools09b70705aee60aa7
30stools7de8e05733d0373c
30stoolsda8299b6f9f41175
30stools1cf554b816d4bcb8
30stoolsa6f4221a9ba80fe2
30stools1226b4f8f1cbbef8
30stools26018cb9e5fa8ada
30stoolsd08ce954b5289d6e
30stools5d5321b553dcae30
30stools691fef69f0579ab1
30stools8f4d0f2a55adaf69
30stools6035d08acf007380
30stools9ed16f6d84a5a315
30stools55854ccf69d9e6ff
30stoolsaedc27c65f8239bc
30stools31e4e02db61ba9c9
30stools79f228e0911b133c
30sprocessscript backend runs setup only
30sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Destructive file system command detecteddist/instructions.d.ts:6 · Destructive file system command detected…task_id of the textured task (confirm its options)\n4. Wait, then download with format \"3mf\"\n5. Present slicer list from step 1, ask user which to use, run its launc…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env.example"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/index.js:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Load environment variables from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈52 tok
1 file · 78 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈16,417 tok
28 tools · 586 per tool
Handshake
2253 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 613

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.