mediawiki-mcp-server@0.21.0
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for MediaWiki" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MCP_OAUTH_CREDENTIALS_FILEMCP_OAUTH_NO_BROWSERMCP_OAUTH_PROXY_STORE_FILEMCP_OAUTH2_CLIENT_IDMCP_OAUTH2_CLIENT_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: CONFIG, ICON_PATHS, MCP_ALLOW_BEARER_PASSTHROUGH, MCP_ALLOW_STATIC_FALLBACK, MCP_CONTENT_MAX_BYTES, MCP_LOG_LEVEL, MCP_METRICS, MCP_SHUTDOWN_GRACE_MS, MCP_TRANSPORT, MCP_TRUSTED_HOSTS, MCP_UPLOAD_DIRS, MCP_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES, MCP_USER_AGENT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MCP_OAUTH_CREDENTIALS_FILE, MCP_OAUTH_NO_BROWSER, MCP_OAUTH_PROXY_STORE_FILE, MCP_OAUTH2_CLIENT_ID, MCP_OAUTH2_CLIENT_SECRET and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 92/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 39 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"inspector": "concurrently --kill-others \"tsc --watch\" \"npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/inspector@latest node dist/index.js\"",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."mcpjam": "concurrently --kill-others \"tsc --watch\" \"npx -y @mcpjam/inspector@latest node $(pwd)/dist/index.js\"",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."inspector:http": "concurrently --kill-others \"tsc --watch\" \"npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/inspector@latest\" \"MCP_TRANSPORT=http node dist/index.js\"",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @professional-wiki/mediawiki-mcp-server@0.21.0 as of 57 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.