mcp@4.7.2

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol (MCP) native server for AI-SDLC tools, resources, and governance" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher aisdlc · publishing for 50 daysInstalls 5,402Last detonated 17 min ago
$claude mcp add mcp -- npx -y @aisdlc/mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Reasonable to connect. No credential asked for, no third-party host named, Server started and answered tools/list.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 4.6.0

vet-skills diff mcp 4.6.0 4.7.2

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 4.6.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 32 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
12sprocessdependency install exit 0
32sclaimed28 tools: new, migrate, verify, report, sdd_change_new, sdd_check_fix, sdd_deposit, sdd_integrate, get_active_handoff, review_submit, inspect_element, verify_quality, verify_schemas, verify_security, verify_traceability, verify_governance, verify_testing, verify_licenses, verify_duplicates, verify_friction, verify_pdac, verify_privacy, report_dashboard, report_quality, kpi_pr
32stools077349cd3fc85db3
32stoolse98cd305f25c29c2
32stoolsb03c45b94bf0e414
32stoolsf8023a0d43f292fe
32stoolsa1b5c48f81933f4f
32stools32cc8fd4a26ec02c
32stoolseae5f7a555c9a0c4
32stools7a146ed2124ea54a
32stoolsb065796e19ac9bb9
32stools18c1ca5145d23f00
32stoolsac06e270bb1fac81
32stoolscf2fab14af7e026c
32stoolscf3d281dc71d7ea2
32stoolsc68e8b07af82a784
32stools9e0f694ad330e6d7
32stools2b00669b8b44f091
32stools9201ae5eb5004878
32stools7674d0ba8afd544e
32stoolsd14256fb97099f8e
32stoolsa9d6d53f9a3cd0be
32stoolsca9bd9ee453714fa
32stools6107559f3b712275
32stools308fa43089485f21
32stools466608e65630a6ba
32stools8a15bb42a4abe21e
32stools42105f3aa9e9fdf2
32stoolsafe56ed792b10a36
32stoolscc4f2e0e3279087a
32sprocessscript backend runs setup only
32sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Tool description instructs the agent: safety bypass instructionmcp:tools/verify_friction:1 · Instruction aimed at the agent: safety bypass instructiontes progressive friction rules and anti-bypass guardrails. {"type":"object","properties":{"change":{"type":"string"},Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)dist/index.d.ts:59 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network…cpServer(options?: CreateMcpServerOptions): Promise<void>; export { type CreateMcpServerOptions, MUTATION_TOOLS, type McpAuditLogEntry, type McpRole, READONLY_ROLES, REVIEWER_ONLY_TOOLS, type RegisterResourcesOptions, type RegisterToolsOpt…Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:141 · Prompt injection — explicit attempt to bypass safety measures · informational: not an instruction file…(string)* | | `verify_friction` | Evaluates progressive friction rules and anti-bypass guardrails (prevents patch-profile changes from modifying protected paths). | `change` *(…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈55 tok
1 file · 10 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈2,571 tok
28 tools · 92 per tool
Handshake
1033 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 63

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

mcp@4.7.2 safety verdict: Verified — KillerSkills