mcp@31.16.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "MCP server, dev tools, and the action-to-tool projection — one authz system, two surfaces" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 92/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
cause: `the remote MCP server "${input.server}" no longer matches tools.lock.json: ${input.changes.join('; ')}`,Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.No other findings across 14,025 lines in 81 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @ultimat3/mcp@31.16.0 as of 30 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.