mcp@2.8.20
VERIFIEDPublisher claims: "MCP server for Microlink API" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MICROLINK_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MICROLINK_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS, MICROLINK_DASHBOARD_URL- Where it talks to
- microlink.io (its own)
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MICROLINK_API_KEY and talks to microlink.io. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 2.8.18
vet-skills diff mcp 2.8.18 2.8.20This version reaches for something 2.8.18 did not: 1 new install script (node scripts/postinstall.js). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New install scripts
- node scripts/postinstall.js
Tool descriptor hashes were not recorded for both runs; renamed or added tools are compared, rewritten descriptions are not.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 26 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
`Without an API key, requests use the free endpoint (${KEYLESS_REQUESTS_PER_DAY} requests/day); a free API key gives ${FREE_PLAN_REQUESTS_PER_DAY} requests/day. Pass apiKey or set MICROLINK_API_KEY.`,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.No other findings across 2,707 lines in 39 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.