mcp@2.16.0

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "An MCP server for TradeCanvas: coding agents look up its indicators, drawing tools, options, feature switches and style keys, and check an options object before they use it." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher tradecanvas · publishing for 29 daysInstalls 20,099Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add mcp -- npx -y @tradecanvas/mcp
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Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso tradingview.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it under the guard; read the third-party hosts first. The code names tradingview.com as well as its own vendor. The guard pins the network to the hosts the honeypot saw.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @tradecanvas/mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 1.79.1

vet-skills diff mcp 1.79.1 2.16.0

This version reaches for something 1.79.1 did not: 1 new host (tradingview.com) · 5 new tools (convert_widget_options, custom_indicator, list_finance_charts, migration_lookup, …). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
tradingview.com
New tools
convert_widget_options, custom_indicator, list_finance_charts, migration_lookup, migration_plan

Tool descriptor hashes were not recorded for both runs; renamed or added tools are compared, rewritten descriptions are not.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 27 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
6.7sprocessdependency install exit 0
27sclaimed12 tools: list_indicators, get_indicator, custom_indicator, list_drawing_tools, list_finance_charts, list_options, list_widget_features, list_style_keys, validate_options, migration_plan, migration_lookup, convert_widget_options
27stools820cb57eef12ad1c
27stoolsa519407fef700f21
27stools9908e9323d106a27
27stools9739506eb0ce6402
27stoolse991cf1678bb6392
27stools73543c6493d57c7b
27stoolsdbed74a2cd891ed1
27stools648917d04efc6889
27stools1c9f47ff13248916
27stoolse3a849aaeeadad59
27stoolsdbd7208e9c9a851f
27stoolsc5c80048276ec961
27sprocessscript backend runs setup only
27sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

No findings across 22,740 lines in 27 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈78 tok
1 file · 27 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈2,317 tok
12 tools · 193 per tool
Handshake
555 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 361

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @tradecanvas/mcp@2.16.0 as of 40 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.