mcp@2.0.3

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "A Model Context Protocol Server for Pica" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server) · listed in the official MCP RegistryPublisher picahq · publishing for 501 daysInstalls 406Last detonated 28 h ago
$claude mcp add mcp -- npx -y @picahq/mcp
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Coverage

Started with a decoy PICA_SECRET; tool list observed. Tool calls with a real credential not tested.
Tested
server startup with a tagged decoy in PICA_SECRET · MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · where the decoy credential went · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with a real credential
Needs
PICA_SECRET — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PICA_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: PICA_, PICA_BASE_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso picaos.com, hubapi.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with a real credential

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names picaos.com, hubapi.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects PICA_SECRET only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @picahq/mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 95/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 77 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
37sprocessdependency install exit 0
57sprocessrelaunched with a decoy PICA_SECRET (tagged; nothing real)
77sclaimed4 tools with a decoy PICA_SECRET: list_pica_integrations, search_pica_platform_actions, get_pica_action_knowledge, execute_pica_action
77stoolseee9ea974032cca8
77stoolsd695e3f2e14f4aed
77stools2b5ff8580094fb27
77stools3ee69d08efe3570e
77sprocessscript backend runs setup only
77sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

No findings across 1,135 lines in 9 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈43 tok
1 file · 9 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈1,094 tok
4 tools · 274 per tool
Handshake
572 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 385

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @picahq/mcp@2.0.3 as of 28 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.