mcp@17.2.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "The official Todoist MCP server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
TODOIST_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ALLOWED_HOSTS, TODOIST_BASE_URL, USE_STRUCTURED_CONTENT- Where it talks to
- todoist.net (its own)
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for TODOIST_API_KEY and talks to todoist.net. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 16.1.1
vet-skills diff mcp 16.1.1 17.2.0In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 16.1.1 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
16.1.1 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 25 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"postbuild": "chmod +x dist/main.js && chmod +x dist/main-http.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.…watch\" \"npm run build:apps -- --watch\" \"npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector npx nodemon --quiet --watch dist --ext js,html --exec node dist/main.js\"", "dev:ht…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."dev:http": "concurrently \"npm run build:lib -- --watch\" \"npm run build:apps -- --watch\" \"npx nodemon --quiet --watch dist --ext js,html --exec node dist/main-http.js\"",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."setup": "cp .env.example .env && npm install && npm run build",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."type-check": "npx tsc --noEmit && npx tsc --noEmit -p .agents/scripts",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.