mcp@11.3.1
VERIFIEDPublisher claims: "Warm local stdio MCP server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
WARM_MCP_CREDENTIALSConfiguration, not credentials: CALLBACK_PATH, WARM_API_TIMEOUT_MS, WARM_CONFIG_DIR- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso warm.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names warm.io as well as its own vendor. The guard injects WARM_MCP_CREDENTIALS only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 11.2.1
vet-skills diff mcp 11.2.1 11.3.1This version reaches for something 11.2.1 did not: 2 new tools (get_handoff_status, request_handoff). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New tools
- get_handoff_status, request_handoff
Tool descriptor hashes were not recorded for both runs; renamed or added tools are compared, rewritten descriptions are not.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 26 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
const WARM_TOML_ENV_BLOCK = /\n?\[mcp_servers\.warm\.env\][\s\S]*?(?=\n\[[^\n]+\]|\s*$)/g;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const candidate = path.join(process.cwd(), '.env');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.