mcp@1.26.19
VERIFIEDPublisher claims: "Social intelligence for 10 networks: read posts and trends, monitor brand mentions, then create." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
NOOTICR_ACCESS_TOKENNOOTICR_CREDENTIALS_FILEConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_SERVER_URL, NOOTICR_API_URL, NOOTICR_BASE_URL, NOOTICR_PORT, NOOTICR_PUBLIC_URL, NOOTICR_TRANSPORT, PUBLIC_URL- Where it talks to
- nooticr.com (its own)Also acme.dev, tiktok.com, instagram.com, youtube.com, douyin.com, xiaohongshu.com, x.com, twitter.com, bilibili.com, linkedin.com, ggpht.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names acme.dev, tiktok.com, instagram.com, youtube.com, douyin.com, xiaohongshu.com, x.com, twitter.com, bilibili.com, linkedin.com, ggpht.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects NOOTICR_ACCESS_TOKEN, NOOTICR_CREDENTIALS_FILE only into requests to nooticr.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 33 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"(see `npx nooticr-mcp --help`).");Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.const mcpUrl = process.env.MCP_SERVER_URL || "https://mcp.nooticr.com";Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them."verify": "npm run build && npx tsc --noEmit && (cd cloudflare && npx tsc --noEmit) && npx vitest run && npm run contract:host && npm run conformance:mcpjam && npx playwright test"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* and a local `npx @nooticr/mcp` user whose call was cut short mid-flight (aFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.throw new NooticrAuthError("Not authenticated with nooticr. Run `npx nooticr-mcp login` to sign in " +Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @nooticr/mcp@1.26.19 as of 46 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.