Skills/npm/mcp

mcp@1.2.13

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "VEYA MCP - Streamable HTTP Model Context Protocol for Robinhood Chain. Default profile is Mainnet." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher veyanet · publishing for 65 daysInstalls 1,069Last detonated 7d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Not enough was observed to say yet. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try mcp` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: URL with embedded credentials; URL with embedded credentials; URL with embedded credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.8sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.9sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
0.9sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.9sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
0.9sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.9sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cli.js:4257 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[veyanet/mcp] MCP POST ${cfg2.publicMcpUrl} (local /mcp)`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/mcpInfoPage.ts:132 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes...(paidCallsOn() ? [["How do metered calls work?", `Call <code>veya_paid_discover</code> to see what is allowed, then <code>veya_paid_call</code> with your VEYA <code>apiKey</code>, your Solana key iFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/paid/fixes5.test.ts:61 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processestest("fix 1: policy denials, their replay, and the kill switch carry code + payment null", async () => {Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/mcpInfoPage.ts:111 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files<p class="note">Your agent passes the key in the <code>apiKey</code> argument only when a tool needs it. The server forwards it to the VEYA API for that call. It is not part of <code>mcp.json</code>, Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsdist/cli.js:3739 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Inter:wght@300;400;500;600;700&family=JetBrains+Mono:wght@400;500;600&display=swap" rel="stylesheet"/>Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/cli.js:3872 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes...paidCallsOn() ? [["How do metered calls work?", `Call <code>veya_paid_discover</code> to see what is allowed, then <code>veya_paid_call</code> with your VEYA <code>apiKey</code>, your Solana key inFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/paid/fixes5.test.ts:99 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processestest("fix 2+4: /health + describe status shows limits, operator-only kill switch, private runs, public receipts", () => {Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/mcpInfoPage.ts:126 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network["How do I connect my client?", `Add <code>${MCP_URL}</code> as a remote MCP server. In Cursor, put <code>{"mcpServers":{"veya":{"url":"${MCP_URL}"}}</code> in <code>~/.cursor/mcp.json</code>. In ClauFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/paid/tools.ts:233 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesserver.tool("veya_paid_call", "Run one metered x402 resource call through the VEYA policy gate. Needs your VEYA apiKey, your Solana key (solanaPrivateKey, pays the USDC) and your Robinhood Chain key (Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cli.js:3853 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files<p class="note">Your agent passes the key in the <code>apiKey</code> argument only when a tool needs it. The server forwards it to the VEYA API for that call. It is not part of <code>mcp.json</code>, Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/cli.js:1557 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"Run one metered x402 resource call through the VEYA policy gate. Needs your VEYA apiKey, your Solana key (solanaPrivateKey, pays the USDC) and your Robinhood Chain key (robinhoodPrivateKey, signs theFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cli.js:3871 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files["Are my keys stored?", `No. <code>apiKey</code>, <code>payerPrivateKey</code>, <code>solanaPrivateKey</code> and <code>robinhoodPrivateKey</code> are tool arguments passed per call. They are not partFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detecteddist/cli.js:3633 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsvar KEY_PLACEHOLDER = "veya_live_\u2022\u2022\u2022\u2022\u2022\u2022\u2022\u2022";Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/mcpInfoPage.ts:131 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files["Are my keys stored?", `No. <code>apiKey</code>, <code>payerPrivateKey</code>, <code>solanaPrivateKey</code> and <code>robinhoodPrivateKey</code> are tool arguments passed per call. They are not partFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsdist/index.js:3498 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Inter:wght@300;400;500;600;700&family=JetBrains+Mono:wght@400;500;600&display=swap" rel="stylesheet"/>Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssrc/veyaPage.ts:142 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Inter:wght@300;400;500;600;700&family=JetBrains+Mono:wght@400;500;600&display=swap" rel="stylesheet"/>Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)dist/cli.js:3866 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network["How do I connect my client?", `Add <code>${MCP_URL}</code> as a remote MCP server. In Cursor, put <code>{"mcpServers":{"veya":{"url":"${MCP_URL}"}}</code> in <code>~/.cursor/mcp.json</code>. In ClauFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)dist/index.d.ts:76 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkexport { MCP_SERVICE_NAME, MCP_SERVICE_VERSION, type McpServiceConfig, createHttpApp, createMcpServer, loadConfig, operatorRelayerWritesEnabled, startHttpServer, writesEnabled };Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/index.js:1471 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"Run one metered x402 resource call through the VEYA policy gate. Needs your VEYA apiKey, your Solana key (solanaPrivateKey, pays the USDC) and your Robinhood Chain key (robinhoodPrivateKey, signs theFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)dist/index.js:3625 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network["How do I connect my client?", `Add <code>${MCP_URL}</code> as a remote MCP server. In Cursor, put <code>{"mcpServers":{"veya":{"url":"${MCP_URL}"}}</code> in <code>~/.cursor/mcp.json</code>. In ClauFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/index.js:3630 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files["Are my keys stored?", `No. <code>apiKey</code>, <code>payerPrivateKey</code>, <code>solanaPrivateKey</code> and <code>robinhoodPrivateKey</code> are tool arguments passed per call. They are not partFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detecteddist/index.js:3392 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsvar KEY_PLACEHOLDER = "veya_live_\u2022\u2022\u2022\u2022\u2022\u2022\u2022\u2022";Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/http.ts:240 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[veyanet/mcp] MCP POST ${cfg.publicMcpUrl} (local /mcp)`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/stdio.js:1451 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"Run one metered x402 resource call through the VEYA policy gate. Needs your VEYA apiKey, your Solana key (solanaPrivateKey, pays the USDC) and your Robinhood Chain key (robinhoodPrivateKey, signs theFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/index.js:3612 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files<p class="note">Your agent passes the key in the <code>apiKey</code> argument only when a tool needs it. The server forwards it to the VEYA API for that call. It is not part of <code>mcp.json</code>, Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/index.js:3631 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes...paidCallsOn() ? [["How do metered calls work?", `Call <code>veya_paid_discover</code> to see what is allowed, then <code>veya_paid_call</code> with your VEYA <code>apiKey</code>, your Solana key inFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/index.js:4010 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[veyanet/mcp] MCP POST ${cfg.publicMcpUrl} (local /mcp)`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈59 tok
1 file · 75 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @veyanet/mcp@1.2.13 as of 7d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim veyanet: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
  6. Unicode escape sequence detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
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