mcp@1.0.7
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for Pascal 3D editor" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
PASCAL_MCP_HTTP_TOKENor--auth-tokenConfiguration, not credentials: PASCAL_INSTANCE_ID, PASCAL_MCP_HTTP_ORIGINS, PASCAL_RUNTIME_VERSION, PASCAL_SDF_CHECKS- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for PASCAL_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 8 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
* Attach an `McpServer` to a Streamable HTTP transport bound to a local port.Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.export declare function registerTools(server: McpServer, operations: SceneOperations, { catalog, geometryScripts, objectMakers, readFile, sceneViews, assetViews }?: ToolHosts): void;Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.outputSchema: { stairId: z.string().min(1), measurements: z.json(), ...liveSyncOutput },Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.* Attach an `McpServer` to a Streamable HTTP transport bound to a local port.Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.export declare function connectHttp(createMcpServer: () => McpServer, port: number, options?: HttpTransportOptions): Promise<HttpTransportHandle>;Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.export declare function registerResources(server: McpServer, operations: SceneOperations, catalog?: AssetCatalog): void;Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @pascal-app/mcp@1.0.7 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.