mcp@1.0.0-beta.5
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for Besales" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
BESALES_OAUTH_AUTHORIZE_URLOAUTH_AUTHORIZE_PATHOAUTH_CALLBACK_PATHor--bearer-token-env-varConfiguration, not credentials: BESALES_API_BASE_URL, BESALES_API_CONTRACTS_DIR, BESALES_LOCALE, BESALES_MCP_SHIPPED_REGISTRY, BESALES_MOCK_API_PORT, BESALES_WORKSPACE_ID, PACKAGE_PATH, REGISTRY_PATH, SHIPPED_REGISTRY_PATH_ENV- Where it talks to
- besales.ai (its own)Also customer.example, example.invalid, api.test — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names customer.example, example.invalid, api.test as well as its own vendor. The guard injects BESALES_OAUTH_AUTHORIZE_URL, OAUTH_AUTHORIZE_PATH, OAUTH_CALLBACK_PATH only into requests to besales.ai (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 11 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
export declare function createHttpMcpServer(options?: HttpServerOptions): {Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.import { runHttpMcpServer } from '../dist/http-server.js';Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.// конверта, поэтому она под тем же флагом: пакет ставится без версии (`npx -y`), иFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.chmod 700 "$secrets_dir"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod 600 "$temporary"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.` Update the client (npx -y @besales/mcp@latest) and run \`besales-mcp connect\` again.`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.'Update the client (npx -y @besales/mcp@latest) and run `besales-mcp connect` again.'Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.local bridge_text=${BESALES_MCP_BRIDGE:-npx -y @besales/mcp@beta}Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @besales/mcp@1.0.0-beta.5 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.