mcp@0.9.33
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "Standalone MCP server for agentmemory — thin shim that re-exposes @agentmemory/agentmemory's MCP entrypoint" Observed in sandbox: sends data to localhost.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · contacted localhost (undeclared)
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Find out what these hosts are first. In the honeypot it contacted localhost, which nothing in the package names as its own. If that is the vendor's service, fine; if you cannot place it, do not connect it.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 66/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: sends data to localhost.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 38 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
No findings across 303 lines in 5 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @agentmemory/mcp@0.9.33 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
14 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.agentmemory/.env.
- Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim agentmemory: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.