mcp@0.57.0

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol for Fonoster" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher fonoster · publishing for 618 daysInstalls 5,591Last detonated 3d ago
$claude mcp add mcp -- npx -y @fonoster/mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MCP_APIKEY_ACCESS_KEY_IDMCP_APIKEY_ACCESS_KEY_SECRETMCP_WORKSPACE_ACCESS_KEY_IDConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_ENDPOINT
Where it talks to
fonoster.com (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MCP_APIKEY_ACCESS_KEY_ID, MCP_APIKEY_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET, MCP_WORKSPACE_ACCESS_KEY_ID and talks to fonoster.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets MCP_APIKEY_ACCESS_KEY_ID=fonoster.com,MCP_APIKEY_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET=fonoster.com,MCP_WORKSPACE_ACCESS_KEY_ID=fonoster.com -- npx -y @fonoster/mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 34 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
14sprocessdependency install exit 0
34sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · 2026-11-11 20:32:58.019 [error]: (common) the environment variable MCP_WORKSPACE_ACCESS_KEY_ID is required but was not found {}
34sprocessscript backend runs setup only
34sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:20 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"postbuild": "chmod +x ./dist/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

No other findings across 1,316 lines in 26 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈43 tok
1 file · 26 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @fonoster/mcp@0.57.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.