mcp@0.51.3

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server that exposes the Macula mesh to any agent harness" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher macula-io · publishing for 77 daysInstalls 4,267Last detonated 7d ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Not enough was observed to say yet. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try mcp` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.7sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.9sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
0.9sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.9sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
0.9sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.9sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/secret_scan.js:65 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// A .env-style (or YAML-style) KEY=value/KEY: value line where KEY readsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/serve.js:45 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// The group is already gone; the child's own kill below is a no-op then.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/mesh_memory.js:107 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// that's secret-bearing by convention (.env, id_rsa, .npmrc, ...)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/secret_scan.js:100 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// realistic bypass, an agent restructuring a .env file's lines intoFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detecteddist/secret_scan.js:24 · Destructive file system command detected// zero, at the honest cost of not catching a truly novel/unknown-formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/mesh_memory.js:114 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreturn { kind: "skipped", path: rel, reason: "filename matches a known secret-bearing convention (.env/.pem/.key/id_rsa/.ssh/.aws/.npmrc/credentials.json) -- refusing to read it at all" };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/secret_scan.js:187 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files/(^|[/\\])\.env(\.|$)/, // .env, .env.local, .env.production, ...Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/bin/doctor.js:9 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code// `npx -y @macula-io/mcp` launch command that fails outright because thisFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shelldist/bin/register.js:79 · Remote installer piped to shell* stdin is a real terminal (curl|bash installs have no TTY and mustFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈54 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @macula-io/mcp@0.51.3 as of 7d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim macula-io: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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