mcp@0.4.28

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for the Lightsage Public API." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher lightsage · publishing for 101 daysInstalls 2,582Last detonated 8 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
5 of 5 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CLERK_SECRET_KEYLIGHTSAGE_API_KEYLIGHTSAGE_API_KEY_AUTHLIGHTSAGE_LIGHTSAGE_API_KEY_AUTHLIGHTSAGE_MCP_TRACKER_API_KEYMCP_EXCHANGE_SECRETMCP_OAUTH_ENABLED or --lightsage-api-key-authConfiguration, not credentials: CLERK_PUBLISHABLE_KEY, LIGHTSAGE_EXCHANGE_URL, MCP_RESOURCE_URL
Where it talks to
lightsage.com (its own)Also speakeasy.com, usesapient.com, gstatic.com, cursor.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names speakeasy.com, usesapient.com, gstatic.com, cursor.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CLERK_SECRET_KEY, LIGHTSAGE_API_KEY, LIGHTSAGE_API_KEY_AUTH, LIGHTSAGE_LIGHTSAGE_API_KEY_AUTH, LIGHTSAGE_MCP_TRACKER_API_KEY, MCP_EXCHANGE_SECRET, MCP_OAUTH_ENABLED only into requests to lightsage.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets CLERK_SECRET_KEY=lightsage.com,LIGHTSAGE_API_KEY=lightsage.com,LIGHTSAGE_API_KEY_AUTH=lightsage.com,LIGHTSAGE_LIGHTSAGE_API_KEY_AUTH=lightsage.com,LIGHTSAGE_MCP_TRACKER_API_KEY=lightsage.com,MCP_EXCHANGE_SECRET=lightsage.com,MCP_OAUTH_ENABLED=lightsage.com -- npx -y @lightsage/mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.4.25

vet-skills diff mcp 0.4.25 0.4.28

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.4.25 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; URL with embedded credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.4sprocess5 of 5 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/lib/env.ts:35 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesglobals.process?.env ?? globals.Deno?.env?.toObject?.() ?? {},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/landing-page.ts:918 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code<code class="code-snippet language-json" id="claude-cli-cmd">claude mcp add LightsageMcp -- npx -y @lightsage/mcp start --lightsage-api-key-auth </code>Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:138 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary> Stdio installation via npm </summary> To start the MCP server, run: ```bash npx @lightsage/mcp start --lightsage-api-key-auth ``` For a full list of sFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/landing-page.ts:969 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code<code class="code-snippet language-json" id="gemini-config">gemini mcp add LightsageMcp -- npx -y @lightsage/mcp start --lightsage-api-key-auth </code>Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssrc/landing-page.ts:66 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Geist+Mono:[email protected]&family=Geist:[email protected]&display=swap" rel="stylesheet">Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈51 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @lightsage/mcp@0.4.28 as of 8 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim lightsage: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim lightsagePropose a patch to the maintainer