mcp@0.30.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol Server for Rebase — exposes schema, DB, document, and user management tools to AI assistants." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher rebasepro · publishing for 122 daysInstalls 3,385Last detonated 3d ago
$claude mcp add mcp -- npx -y @rebasepro/mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ADMIN_CONNECTION_STRINGDATABASE_URLREBASE_API_TOKENREBASE_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: DOTENV_CONFIG_PATH, PATHEXT, REBASE_BASE_URL, REBASE_MCP_ALLOW_REMOTE_WRITES, REBASE_PROJECT_DIR
Where it talks to
rebase.pro (its own)Also myapp.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names myapp.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ADMIN_CONNECTION_STRING, DATABASE_URL, REBASE_API_TOKEN, REBASE_TOKEN only into requests to rebase.pro (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets ADMIN_CONNECTION_STRING=rebase.pro,DATABASE_URL=rebase.pro,REBASE_API_TOKEN=rebase.pro,REBASE_TOKEN=rebase.pro -- npx -y @rebasepro/mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 6 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
6.0sprocessdependency install exit 1 · (Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created) npm error Cannot read properties of null (reading 'edgesOut') npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: /tmp/ks-detonate-qA5KQ8/task/home/.npm/_logs/2026-11-12T00_34_49_207Z-debug-0.log
6.0sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
6.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
6.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/index.d.ts:88 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* switched to, and above the `.env` of the project it runs in. Handing theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/index.d.ts:368 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files* same `.rebase/state.json` these two never read. The output belongs to theFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/index.js:310 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesresolve(projectDir, "app", ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/index.js:2081 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files* same `.rebase/state.json` these two never read. The output belongs to theFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/index.js:2995 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code" npx -y @rebasepro/mcp\n\n" +Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/index.d.ts:83 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* startup `.env` load put into it.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/index.js:309 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesresolve(projectDir, ".env"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/index.d.ts:93 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* reads its own project's `.env` itself, so leaving these out loses nothing.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/index.js:319 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* Read one variable out of one `.env` file, or undefined if it isn't there.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/index.js:298 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* Read a variable out of a project's `.env` (project root, or `app/`).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cloud-tools.js:380 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"It belongs in the build (the shell running the deploy, or the app's .env.production), not here.";Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/index.js:205 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions// `mode` only applies on create, so chmod covers pre-existing files.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/index.d.ts:227 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* used to read `<projectDir>/.env` first and only then `process.env`, which isFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/index.js:300 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* The active project is not necessarily the one whose `.env` was loaded intoFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/index.d.ts:220 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files/** `"the environment"`, or the path of the `.env` file that names it. */Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈64 tok
1 file · 9 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @rebasepro/mcp@0.30.1 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.