mcp@0.2.12
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Configuration and data Model Context Protocol servers for Workbase applications." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
GITHUB_TOKENWORKBASE_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: CONFIG_PROPOSER, CONFIG_PROPOSER_KEY, CONFIG_PROPOSER_URL, GITHUB_REF, GITHUB_REPOSITORY, PR_NUMBER, WORKBASE_BASE_URL, WORKBASE_DEBUG, WORKBASE_DOMAIN, WORKBASE_MCP_DEV_MODULE, WORKBASE_MCP_ROLE_DATABASES, WORKBASE_MCP_STATE_ROOT, WORKBASE_ORG_ID, WORKBASE_STAGE_PREFIX, WORKBASE_TARGET- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for GITHUB_TOKEN, WORKBASE_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 53 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
|| basePaths.some(path => !['package.json', 'bun.lock'].includes(path) && evidence.baseInputHashes[path] !== result.inputHashes[path])) reject()Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.const kill = (signal: NodeJS.Signals) => {Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @workbasehq/mcp@0.2.12 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.