Skills/npm/mcp

mcp@0.2.11

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server exposing NodeGX (OpenNoodl) v2 projects to external AI agents." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher nodegx · publishing for 34 daysInstalls 1,576Last detonated 10 h ago
$claude mcp add mcp -- npx -y @nodegx/mcp
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso nodejs.org, noodl.net, cloudflare.com, cloudflare-dns.com, githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @nodegx/mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 20 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
20sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · '/tmp/ks-detonate-drLpKV/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/mcp/bin/noodl-mcp.js' ] } Node.js v22.23.5
20sprocessscript backend runs setup only
20sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/backend/vm/provision-app.sh:110 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown root:"$APP_USER" "$SECRETS"; chmod 640 "$SECRETS"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cloudflare/deploy.cjs:5150 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst envFile = path3.join(dir, ".env");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cloudflare/deploy.cjs:5503 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst found = leaks(uploaded, [{ what: "the admin credential", value: record.adminToken }, ...project.envValues.map((v, i) => ({ what: `.env value ${i + 1}`, value: v }))]);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/src/external/viewer/react19/react-dom.production.min.js:15 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…nstable_NormalPriority,Cy=P.unstable_LowPriority,W0=P.unstable_IdlePriority,xy=P.log,Ky=P.unstable_setDisableYieldValue,rt=null,Tl=null;function Ly(l){if(Tl&&typeof Tl.onCommitFiberRoot=="function")try{Tl.onCommitFiberRoot(rt,l,void 0,(l.c…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/backend/folder/start.js:38 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files* the backend loads the project's. Webhook secrets stay in `data/secrets.json`, so a sender'sFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/backend/vm/provision-app.sh:108 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown -R root:root "$FOLDER"; chmod -R u+rwX,go+rX,go-w "$FOLDER"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cloudflare/deploy.cjs:5505 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessay(` 0 of ${uploaded.length} files hold the admin credential or a .env value.`);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/render-harness/drive-steps.js:1972 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code`The viewer bundle is missing. Build it first: cd packages/noodl-viewer-react && npx webpack --config webpack-configs/webpack.viewer.prod.js. Probed: ${HARNESS_PATHS.VIEWER_DIR.probed.join(", ")}`Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cloudflare/deploy.cjs:3084 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log("Error: Node", this.name, "doesn't have a output named", outputName);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/render-harness/measure-from-disk.js:1972 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code`The viewer bundle is missing. Build it first: cd packages/noodl-viewer-react && npx webpack --config webpack-configs/webpack.viewer.prod.js. Probed: ${HARNESS_PATHS.VIEWER_DIR.probed.join(", ")}`Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/src/external/viewer/react-dom.production.min.js:224 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…,Ng=Ba.unstable_IdlePriority,Uc=null,Ca=null,ta=Math.clz32?Math.clz32:pj,qj=Math.log,rj=Math.LN2,Wc=64,Rd=4194304,z=0,Ae=!1,Yc=[],Va=null,Wa=null,Xa=null,jc=new Map,kc=new Map,Ya=[],Bj="mousedown mouseup touchcancel touchend touchstart aux…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/backend/vm/provision-app.sh:111 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown -R "$APP_USER":"$APP_USER" "/var/lib/$APP"; chmod 750 "/var/lib/$APP"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cloudflare/deploy.cjs:3061 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log("Error: Node", this.name, "doesn't have a output named", name2);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cloudflare/deploy.cjs:5588 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filessay(`The backend's dashboard: ${url}/_admin \u2014 its admin credential is in ${path3.join(dir, "deployment.json")} (never uploaded).`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cloudflare/deploy.cjs:2683 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log("Node " + this.name + ": Invalid input property " + name2);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cloudflare/deploy.cjs:2814 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log("node doesn't have input", name, "for node:", this.name);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈57 tok
1 file · 40 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @nodegx/mcp@0.2.11 as of 10 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.