mcp@0.14.42

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for the Topolo platform. Exposes scope-gated tools that third-party agents (Claude, Codex, etc.) can call natively." Observed in sandbox: sends data to 2606:4700:3108::ac42:2b58, 2606:4700:3108::ac42:28a8, 172.66.40.168, 172.66.43.88.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher topolo · publishing for 210 daysInstalls 2,963Last detonated 5 min ago

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Needs
TOPOLO_API_KEY, TOPOLO_ACCESS_TOKEN — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ACTION_SECRET_PREFIX2TOPOLO_ACCESS_TOKENTOPOLO_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MACOS_KEYCHAIN_CHUNK_PREFIX, TOPOLO_AGENT_INSTALLATION_ID, TOPOLO_AGENT_NAME, TOPOLO_AGENT_TASK_ID, TOPOLO_CONFIG_LOCK_TIMEOUT_MS, TOPOLO_CONFIG_PATH, TOPOLO_CONTEXT, TOPOLO_ENV, TOPOLO_INSTALLATIONS_PATH
Where it talks to
topolo.app, topolo.us, topolo.dev, topolo.io (its own)Also ol0.me — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · contacted 2606:4700:3108::ac42:2b58, 2606:4700:3108::ac42:28a8, 172.66.40.168, 172.66.43.88 (undeclared)
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Find out what these hosts are first. In the honeypot it contacted 2606:4700:3108::ac42:2b58, 2606:4700:3108::ac42:28a8, 172.66.40.168, 172.66.43.88, which nothing in the package names as its own. If that is the vendor's service, fine; if you cannot place it, do not connect it.

$vet-skills run --net 2606:4700:3108::ac42:2b58,2606:4700:3108::ac42:28a8,172.66.40.168,172.66.43.88 -- npx -y @topolo/mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.14.39

vet-skills diff mcp 0.14.39 0.14.42

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.14.39 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 67/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: sends data to 2606:4700:3108::ac42:2b58, 2606:4700:3108::ac42:28a8, 172.66.40.168, 172.66.43.88.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 51 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
11sprocessdependency install exit 0
31sprocessrelaunched with a decoy TOPOLO_API_KEY, TOPOLO_ACCESS_TOKEN (tagged; nothing real)
51snetworkdirect connection to 2606:4700:3108::ac42:2b58:0, bypassing the egress proxy · undeclared
51snetworkdirect connection to 2606:4700:3108::ac42:28a8:0, bypassing the egress proxy · undeclared
51snetworkdirect connection to 172.66.40.168:0, bypassing the egress proxy · undeclared
51snetworkdirect connection to 172.66.43.88:0, bypassing the egress proxy · undeclared
51snetworkdirect connection to 172.66.40.168:443, bypassing the egress proxy · undeclared
51sclaimedstartup only: exited before answering, asking for TOPOLO_API_KEY, TOPOLO_ACCESS_TOKEN (a decoy value was refused)
51sprocessscript backend runs setup only
51sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/index.js:3973 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsimport { mkdir as mkdir2, readFile as readFile2, chmod as chmod2, lstat, readdir as readdir2 } from "fs/promises";Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/index.js:3982 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsimport { mkdir, readFile, readdir, rename, rm, writeFile, chmod } from "fs/promises";Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/index.js:5101 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files...credentials.map((credential) => credential?.kind === "access_token" ? accessTokenSubject(credential.accessToken) : void 0),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈71 tok
1 file · 9 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

13 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim topolo: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim topoloPropose a patch to the maintainer