mcp@0.13.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for ByCrawl - query 16 social and data platforms from AI agents" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher bycrawl · publishing for 260 daysInstalls 9,373Last detonated 12 h ago
$claude mcp add mcp -- npx -y @bycrawl/mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
BYCRAWL_API_KEYJWT_SECRETSUPABASE_SECRET_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: BYCRAWL_API_URL, EXTERNAL_URL, KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY, SUPABASE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY, SUPABASE_URL, TRANSPORT
Where it talks to
bycrawl.com (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for BYCRAWL_API_KEY, JWT_SECRET, SUPABASE_SECRET_KEY and talks to bycrawl.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets BYCRAWL_API_KEY=bycrawl.com,JWT_SECRET=bycrawl.com,SUPABASE_SECRET_KEY=bycrawl.com -- npx -y @bycrawl/mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 92/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 7 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
6.8sprocessdependency install exit 1 · (Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created) npm error Cannot read properties of null (reading 'edgesOut') npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: /tmp/ks-detonate-91d2rl/task/home/.npm/_logs/2026-11-14T01_19_06_449Z-debug-0.log
6.8sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
6.8sprocessscript backend runs setup only
6.8sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbuild/transport-http.js:71 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[MCP POST] session ${sessionId} not found in ${Object.keys(sessions).length} active sessions — treating as new`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbuild/transport-http.js:67 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[MCP POST] existing session ${sessionId}, body method=${req.body?.method}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbuild/transport-http.js:75 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[MCP POST] ${sessionId ? "stale session recovery" : "new session"} (initialize)`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbuild/transport-http.js:80 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[MCP POST] session initialized: ${sid}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbuild/transport-http.js:60 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[MCP POST] apiKey=${maskedKey} sessionId=${req.headers["mcp-session-id"] ?? "(none)"}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈53 tok
1 file · 59 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @bycrawl/mcp@0.13.1 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.