mcp@0.113.0
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "Anychat MCP server — drive your Anychat workspace (agents, playbooks, channels, people, outreach) from Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, or any MCP host." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Started with a decoy ANYCHAT_API_KEY; tool list observed. Tool calls with a real credential not tested.- Tested
- server startup with a tagged decoy in ANYCHAT_API_KEY · MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · where the decoy credential went · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with a real credential
- Needs
- ANYCHAT_API_KEY — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ANYCHAT_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ANYCHAT_API_URL, ANYCHAT_DOCS_URL- Where it talks to
- anychat.ai (its own)
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with a real credential
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for ANYCHAT_API_KEY and talks to anychat.ai. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Credential pass-through configuration; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 50 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
…lack, viber, poe → bind_channel); 422 for a value Google does not accept. Never pass credentials. Maps to POST /v1/orgs/{org}/agents/{agent}/channels with mode "managed".', …Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…, response, errorResponse }, runbook[] (setup and branching steps, in order) }. Paste your API key (scope integrations:ajo) in place of the Authorization placeholder. 422 agent.o…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* ANYCHAT_API_KEY=sk-any-... npx -y @anychat-ai/mcpFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @anychat-ai/mcp@0.113.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim anychat-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.