mcp@0.1.336
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "StarReel MCP server — drive the AI short-drama production pipeline (script → storyboards → frames → video → final cut) from Claude, Cursor, or any MCP client" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
- Needs
- STARREEL_API_KEY — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
STARREEL_API_KEYSTARREEL_AUTH_BASEConfiguration, not credentials: STARREEL_LOC_BASE, STARREEL_MCP_LANG- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso shortreelai.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names shortreelai.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects STARREEL_API_KEY, STARREEL_AUTH_BASE only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; References a credential file in the home directory; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 45 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
* claude mcp add starreel -e STARREEL_API_KEY=srk_live_... -- npx -y @starreel/mcpFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.' claude mcp add starreel -e STARREEL_API_KEY=srk_live_... -- npx -y @starreel/mcp');Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// .sh 要可执行,否则第三方还得自己 chmod 一次才跑得起来Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.* ② realpath 后的路径中不得含任何以 '.' 开头的路径段(~/.ssh、~/.codex、Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* 符号链接先解析再判(防 media.jpg -> ~/.ssh/id_rsa 绕过)。Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.… are fixed and cannot be customized.\nRefuses to write into hidden directories (~/.ssh, ~/.config, .git…) and system directories—this is disk writing, not reading, an…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* ~/.aws、.git 等敏感目录全部命中),也不得落在系统配置区(/etc、/private/etc)。Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* ① 扩展名必须是对应 kind 的媒体白名单(.env/.pem/id_rsa 天然出局);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* ~/.ssh/id_rsa、.env、浏览器资料库当"素材"上传到 COS(公共可读 URL)。Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.… assemble.sh)直接写到你本地的一个目录,省掉自己复制粘贴。免费。目录必须**已存在**且是绝对路径;文件名固定,不接受自定义。\n拒绝写入隐藏目录(~/.ssh、~/.config、.git…)与系统目录——这是写盘不是读盘,覆盖错地方不可逆。\n落盘后完整流程:\n python3 fetch_pack.py ma…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.download: 'save_handoff_toolchain → python3 fetch_pack.py manifest.json -o ./pack;得到源素材、POSTPRODUCTION.md、comparison.html。',Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.…m (manifest provides scene_boundary as a scene-boundary criterion), write a plan.json; ④ Use get_handoff_toolchain to get compile_timeline.py to expand the timeline and assemble.sh to assemble the final cut. The toolchain already calculate…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.* ~/.ssh/id_rsa、.env、浏览器资料库当"素材"上传到 COS(公共可读 URL)。Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.<summary><b>No Node / can't run npx?</b> (Coze, Dify, GPTs, custom agents)</summary> Drive the same pipeline over REST (`/v1/produce/*`) and paste [`SKILL.md`](Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.'拒绝写入隐藏目录(~/.ssh、~/.config、.git…)与系统目录——这是写盘不是读盘,覆盖错地方不可逆。\n' +Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @starreel/mcp@0.1.336 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim starreel: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.