mcp@0.1.1006-wip.stopsender.20261106.1
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Sellable MCP server for Claude Code, Codex, and Hermes campaign workflows" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.- It will ask for
- unknown until the next run
- Where it talks to
- unknown until the next run
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Not enough was observed to say yet. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try mcp` runs it now and prints the full answer.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
return `Sellable update available: ${versions}. Run: curl -fsSL "https://app.sellable.dev/api/v2/cli/install" | sh.${installerVersion}`;Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return 'Run curl -fsSL "https://app.sellable.dev/api/v2/cli/install" | sh, then restart Claude Code/Codex so Sellable reloads.';Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.// Best effort; local calibration failure must not kill a leased run.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.? 'Run curl -fsSL "https://app.sellable.dev/api/v2/cli/install" | sh'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.prepareMessagesRule: `Default create-campaign stays on the existing reviewBatchLimit:15 first campaign-table execution slice. For plain post-mint fill/load/refill requests, load get_subskill_prompt({ Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.? 'Run curl -fsSL "https://app.sellable.dev/api/v2/cli/install" | sh'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return `Sellable update available: ${versions}. Run: curl -fsSL "https://app.sellable.dev/api/v2/cli/install" | sh.${installerVersion}`;Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.["prepare" + "MessagesRule"]: "Default create-campaign still prepares its bounded first review slice. For any later fill/load/refill request, load refill-sends-workflow and core/flow.v1.json completelFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.return 'Run curl -fsSL "https://app.sellable.dev/api/v2/cli/install" | sh, then restart Claude Code/Codex so Sellable reloads.';Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @sellable/mcp@0.1.1006-wip.stopsender.20261106.1 as of 8d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim sellable: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.