mcp@0.0.140
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Tempo MCP server for Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, and any other MCP-compatible host. One server exposing Tempo's issues, docs, comments, agents, scripts, Slack, Linear, and canvas toolsets." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ENV_TOKEN_VARTEMPO_AUTH_URLConfiguration, not credentials: TEMPO_CONVEX_SITE_URL, TEMPO_CONVEX_URL, TEMPO_LOGIN_SITE_URL, TEMPO_MCP_HOME, TEMPO_MCP_NO_BROWSER, TEMPO_MCP_READONLY, TEMPO_MCP_SIGN_IN_WAIT_MS- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso tempo.build, convex.site, convex.cloud — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names tempo.build, convex.site, convex.cloud as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ENV_TOKEN_VAR, TEMPO_AUTH_URL only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 4 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"Not signed in. Use a Tempo tool from your agent to get a sign-in link, or run `npx -y @tempo-ai/mcp login`."Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.console.error("Not signed in. Run `npx -y @tempo-ai/mcp login` first.");Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.4. In a chat, enable the connector under **Plus → More → Developer mode**.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.deep-research tools; Developer mode unlocks full tool calling.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.claude mcp add tempo -- npx -y @tempo-ai/mcpFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.**Advanced settings** → enable **Developer mode**.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent."Not signed in to Tempo. Run `npx -y @tempo-ai/mcp login` in a terminal, or set TEMPO_AUTH_TOKEN for headless environments."Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Note: without Developer mode, ChatGPT connectors only run search-styleFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Note: without Developer mode, ChatGPT connectors only run search-styleFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.deep-research tools; Developer mode unlocks full tool calling.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."Not signed in to Tempo. Retry the tool to get a sign-in link, or run `npx -y @tempo-ai/mcp login`."Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.4. In a chat, enable the connector under **Plus → More → Developer mode**.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent."[tempo-mcp] Tempo session expired. Run `npx -y @tempo-ai/mcp login` to sign in again."Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.**Advanced settings** → enable **Developer mode**.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."Signed out. The next Tempo tool call from your agent will prompt for sign-in (or run `npx -y @tempo-ai/mcp login`)."Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."Tempo session expired. Retry the tool to get a sign-in link, or run `npx -y @tempo-ai/mcp login`."Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @tempo-ai/mcp@0.0.140 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.