mcp@0.0.11
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "Ahrefs MCP server" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-10-26 and scored it 52/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; File permission modification command; Process kill command. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyt+CategoryObserved action
This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
CRITICAL
Privileged sudo commandREADME.md:147 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05HIGH
File permission modification commandREADME.md:147 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05LOW
Unpinned dependencyREADME.md:27 · Unpinned dependencyFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06HIGH
Process kill commandREADME.md:69 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05What would make this Verified
28 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Privileged sudo command≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ahrefs: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- File permission modification command≈ +4 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Process kill command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unpinned dependencies≈ +1 on the totalPin exact versions (and ideally hashes) in package.json, requirements or the install script so the bundle cannot change under you.
- Unpinned dependency≈ +1 on the totalPin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
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