mcp@0.0.1-beta.14752

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "Product Brain — MCP server for AI-assisted product knowledge management" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher productbrain · publishing for 266 daysInstalls 116KLast detonated 3d ago
$claude mcp add mcp -- npx -y @productbrain/mcp
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
API_KEY_FORMAT_LINEAPI_KEY_PREFIXOAUTH_REDIRECT_HOST_ALLOWLISTPRODUCTBRAIN_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: AGENT_KEY_PREFIX, CLAUDE_CODE_SESSION_ID, CODEX_TUI_SESSION_LOG_PATH, CONNECT_PAGE_PATH, CONVEX_FALLBACK_URLS, CONVEX_SITE_URL, CORS_ORIGINS, CURSOR_CONVERSATION_ID, MCP_DEBUG, MCP_PORT, PB_CONVERSATION_ID, PRODUCTBRAIN_APP_URL, PRODUCTBRAIN_URL
Where it talks to
productbrain.io (its own)Also claude.ai, claude.com, chatgpt.com, cursor.com, partner.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names claude.ai, claude.com, chatgpt.com, cursor.com, partner.example as well as its own vendor. The guard injects API_KEY_FORMAT_LINE, API_KEY_PREFIX, OAUTH_REDIRECT_HOST_ALLOWLIST, PRODUCTBRAIN_API_KEY only into requests to productbrain.io (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets API_KEY_FORMAT_LINE=productbrain.io,API_KEY_PREFIX=productbrain.io,OAUTH_REDIRECT_HOST_ALLOWLIST=productbrain.io,PRODUCTBRAIN_API_KEY=productbrain.io -- npx -y @productbrain/mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 31 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
11sprocessdependency install exit 0
31sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-QqF0BG/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/mcp/dist/chunk-MRQMO5IR.js' } Node.js v22.23.4
31sprocessscript backend runs setup only
31sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsdist/setup-N3YX575R.js:111 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringconst apiKey = await prompt(` Paste your API key (${API_KEY_PREFIX} or ${AGENT_KEY_PREFIX}): `);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/chunk-IK6YUCLY.js:1675 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code`API key is valid but no workspace is associated. Run \`npx ${MCP_NPX_PACKAGE} setup\` or regenerate your key.`Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/index.js:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst envPath = resolve(process.cwd(), ".env.mcp");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env.mcp.example"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈58 tok
1 file · 9 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @productbrain/mcp@0.0.1-beta.14752 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.