Skills/npm/mcp-virustotal

mcp-virustotal@1.0.40

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "MCP server for VirusTotal API integration" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher burtthecoder · publishing for 707 daysInstalls 3,639Last detonated 14 h ago
$claude mcp add mcp-virustotal -- npx -y @burtthecoder/mcp-virustotal
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Coverage

Started with a decoy VIRUSTOTAL_API_KEY; tool list observed. Tool calls with a real credential not tested.
Tested
server startup with a tagged decoy in VIRUSTOTAL_API_KEY · MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · where the decoy credential went · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with a real credential
Needs
VIRUSTOTAL_API_KEY — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
VIRUSTOTAL_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_ENDPOINT, MCP_HOST, MCP_PORT, MCP_TRANSPORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso virustotal.com, readme.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with a real credential

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names virustotal.com, readme.io as well as its own vendor. The guard injects VIRUSTOTAL_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @burtthecoder/mcp-virustotal

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 1.0.38

vet-skills diff mcp-virustotal 1.0.38 1.0.40

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.0.38 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 48 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
7.3sprocessdependency install exit 0
27sprocessrelaunched with a decoy VIRUSTOTAL_API_KEY (tagged; nothing real)
47sclaimed11 tools with a decoy VIRUSTOTAL_API_KEY: get_url_report, get_url_relationship, get_file_report, get_file_relationship, get_ip_report, get_ip_relationship, get_domain_report, get_domain_relationship, search_vt, get_file_behaviour_summary, get_collection
47stoolsaa05c9006ff0b870
47stools1c18cdb7bcff5645
47stoolsb2f5a0c20387bbc7
47stoolsbd0c2033cd234888
47stoolsea830d1cc5b698f1
47stools5b0f583cc5632bb6
47stoolsd4af8c7a1bd39239
47stools5f93314d477e314f
47stools1354a3d5a9a4122d
47stools4d5f1539c5661829
47stoolscbe0116d29be5107
47sprocessscript backend runs setup only
47sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:17 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build": "tsc && chmod +x build/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

No other findings across 2,047 lines in 27 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈51 tok
1 file · 27 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈2,795 tok
11 tools · 254 per tool
Handshake
806 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 299

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @burtthecoder/mcp-virustotal@1.0.40 as of 14 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

mcp-virustotal@1.0.40 safety verdict: Verified — KillerSkills