mcp-unifi-network@0.8.0
VERIFIEDPublisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for the UniFi Network API" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
UNIFI_API_KEYUNIFI_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: UNIFI_ALLOW_WRITES, UNIFI_APP_VERSION, UNIFI_CONFIG, UNIFI_CONSOLE_ID, UNIFI_DEBUG, UNIFI_ENABLE_LEGACY, UNIFI_HOST, UNIFI_INSECURE_TLS, UNIFI_MAX_PAGES, UNIFI_MAX_RETRIES, UNIFI_MODE, UNIFI_PAGE_LIMIT, UNIFI_PORT, UNIFI_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS, UNIFI_SITE, UNIFI_USERNAME- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso ui.com, unconfigured.invalid — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names ui.com, unconfigured.invalid as well as its own vendor. The guard injects UNIFI_API_KEY, UNIFI_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 0.6.0
vet-skills diff mcp-unifi-network 0.6.0 0.8.0In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.6.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 33 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
if (statSync(path).mode & 63) process.stderr.write(`[unifi] ${path} is readable by other users. Run: chmod 600 ${path}\n`);Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.* `https://192.168.1.1:8443/network/default/dashboard` has to work as well asFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.* `https://192.168.1.1:8443/network/default/dashboard` has to work as well asFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @mgcrea/mcp-unifi-network@0.8.0 as of 28 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.