mcp-tools@1.0.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Tools for writing MCP clients and servers without pain" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What changed since 0.9.0
vet-skills diff mcp-tools 0.9.0 1.0.0This version reaches for something 0.9.0 did not: 3 new hosts (agenticresourcediscovery.org, clerk.com, example.dev) · 1 new credential variable (CLERK_SECRET_KEY). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New hosts
- agenticresourcediscovery.org, clerk.com, example.dev
- New credential variables
- CLERK_SECRET_KEY
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 95/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
No findings across 6,758 lines in 21 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.