Skills/npm/mcp-server

mcp-server@3.5.3

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "MCP server for FireCMS Cloud — manage projects, collections, users, and AI features via the Model Context Protocol" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server) · listed in the official MCP RegistryPublisher firecms · publishing for 270 daysInstalls 1,484Last detonated 48 min ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server -- npx -y @firecms/mcp-server
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Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SECURE_TOKEN_URLConfiguration, not credentials: FIRECMS_API_URL
Where it talks to
firecms.co (its own)Also google.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names google.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SECURE_TOKEN_URL only into requests to firecms.co (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets SECURE_TOKEN_URL=firecms.co -- npx -y @firecms/mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 3.5.1

vet-skills diff mcp-server 3.5.1 3.5.3

This version reaches for something 3.5.1 did not: 6 rewritten tool descriptors (delete_property, list_documents, save_property, update_default_locale, …). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

Rewritten tool descriptors
delete_property, list_documents, save_property, update_default_locale, update_project_colors, update_project_name

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 33 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
12sprocessdependency install exit 0
32sclaimed45 tools: firecms_get_current_user, list_firebase_projects, get_project_setup_status, list_firestore_locations, enable_project_apis, enable_firestore, connect_project_to_firecms, apply_firestore_security_rules, create_firecms_webapp, list_projects, get_root_collections, list_subcollections, list_users, add_user, update_user_roles, remove_user, list_databases, preview_inferred_schema, infer_collections_from_data, setup_all_collections, get_project_config, update_project_name, update_project_colors, update_default_locale, toggle_text_search
32stools13d46a10433494b1
32stools94d8d4bbfead4e5d
32stools19a972cfe5087130
32stools91115e58f93f1625
32stools46932ebd7a5c34b7
32stools83b68e8ac4b6ec05
32stools294771f37992afa0
32stools8cd2ef3dfdb71682
32stools9437c0f390eba8e5
32stools81a3642b6dcbe3e8
32stoolsc342d6b7113106bb
32stools7ce308a0aa40136c
32stools293fbc5cfc240042
32stools672c0867eb2f2beb
32stools20d82e2e0887a729
32stools7a2023d511c0c302
32stools9dc70aab4f66181e
32stools8d74bc8199e69b1c
32stoolsd70759732ea46238
32stools487ad203a065e245
32stools44e99aa1e6bdbf43
32stoolsf10da9d105da5b69
32stools8ad24120e785b421
32stools984d4ee8765a77fe
32stoolsfb5e2a18a7872775
32stoolsaf2d0dd67fb8ea24
32stoolsad60d7642f603c40
32stools631e7980ca7d4f4b
32stools7ce891982aadfbfe
32stoolsaf53025f7a39cfd6
32stools54cba11b3798ed92
32stools6986786fbea7e6e5
32stools88b5c0527619a654
32stoolse13b82d49be248b5
32stoolsac04f93e84741790
32stools999ea5685a46e1ec
32stoolsc39d9977dd6bcec3
32stoolsbe970a0efa30ebb1
32stoolseacad5a78fdfb649
32stools005359db8e891721
32stoolseeb2c197fe04d9c3
32stoolsc689f31ddada682f
32stools054c32aa05fddef1
32stoolsaa9c16b605602158
32stoolse9dd1d7434fc9a79
32sprocessscript backend runs setup only
32sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/tools/current-user.ts:7 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkexport function registerCurrentUserTool(server: McpServer, session: FireCMSSession, mode: FireCMSServerMode) {Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)dist/tools/current-user.d.ts:6 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkexport declare function registerCurrentUserTool(server: McpServer, session: FireCMSSession, mode: FireCMSServerMode): void;Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈66 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈8,630 tok
45 tools · 192 per tool
Handshake
1800 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 202

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.