Skills/npm/mcp-server

mcp-server@3.22.0

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "Approve plans, track initiatives and work items, and steer AI engineering crews in AnyForge." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server) · listed in the official MCP RegistryPublisher anyforge · publishing for 173 daysInstalls 4,985Last detonated 13 h ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server -- npx -y @anyforge/mcp-server
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Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ANYFORGE_API_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: ANYFORGE_API_URL
Where it talks to
anyforge.ai (its own)
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for ANYFORGE_API_TOKEN and talks to anyforge.ai. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind.

$vet-skills run --secrets ANYFORGE_API_TOKEN=anyforge.ai -- npx -y @anyforge/mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 3.21.0

vet-skills diff mcp-server 3.21.0 3.22.0

This version reaches for something 3.21.0 did not: 2 rewritten tool descriptors (anyforge_create_work_item, anyforge_update_work_item). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

Rewritten tool descriptors
anyforge_create_work_item, anyforge_update_work_item

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 26 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
5.9sprocessdependency install exit 0
26sclaimed273 tools: anyforge_branch_studio_session, anyforge_rewind_studio_session, anyforge_update_studio_review_finding, anyforge_get_studio_pr_comments, anyforge_get_studio_pr_jobs, anyforge_get_studio_pr_logs, anyforge_request_studio_review, anyforge_list_studio_crew_batches, anyforge_get_studio_crew_batch, anyforge_preview_studio_crew_batch, anyforge_cancel_studio_crew_batch, anyforge_retry_studio_crew_batch, anyforge_list_studio_sessions, anyforge_create_studio_session, anyforge_get_studio_usage, anyforge_get_studio_session, anyforge_update_studio_session, anyforge_get_studio_context, anyforge_add_studio_context, anyforge_list_studio_runs, anyforge_start_studio_run, anyforge_get_studio_run, anyforge_get_studio_run_events, anyforge_control_studio_run, anyforge_get_studio_changes
26stoolsb07b77188f8c78a5
26stools1f8655193bfd5561
26stools0cb88e0fb427a4ff
26stools7d524336e50c1ffd
26stools44206e02eea2984d
26stools93f05a82ee025b72
26stools5e4ac021080bd0f5
26stools4bb94b8b8304197e
26stoolsbfbd02e676a35573
26stoolse471a667dc4036b8
26stools711032bfeb67221a
26stoolsd6af9c17e14eacf8
26stools0978777fa186217c
26stools30f59d7cf2186ed6
26stoolse147662dd1a2372c
26stools540cc1c71c209481
26stools328f3348d1a1ad89
26stools3691dc8653180945
26stools27a62d73cf3d6254
26stools29d6688b3cfa2148
26stoolsaf373a39a63e8d87
26stools6a53cd21a1cb42dd
26stools3cc9c01736b9d944
26stools80e3bcb50e5924af
26stoolscc07565f9c928037
26stoolsf208306398d36329
26stoolsec056fa83d86d6ed
26stoolsb5e63e97883d32b8
26stoolse6bd9df7852a1f35
26stools290125fc45f18376
26stools4e5283c7801f37e5
26stools65d38b7593fed2d7
26stools344fef03a1d02d9d
26stools1e0a81319e2cd913
26stoolsa7ffa9388c8f9795
26stools0fa2cf5e8127ee36
26stools101d127c1a276727
26stools3f73b65ec3dd4b6b
26stools7ddb95b00f686d9e
26stools47c41382c572f6ba
26stoolsbe9d0917e70daaf5
26stoolsff60f4690ba0a678
26stools102e5561b00c80c4
26stools443386bbda625b1c
26stools0f02024fb341cbfd
26stoolsdeef39d189ec81aa
26stools07ccfcb4b250aaf5
26stools85af972e7bacc207
26stools6538949298dde656
26stools9a77f39e684d9b1b
26stools467f21ae72f9740a
26stools279364e0ff34e9db
26stools14cde611007e39a7
26stools4a74494e1d2749eb
26stools324fb26b6c635fae
26stoolscba612aacd86794a
26stoolsaf479a3aefc9277e
26stoolsa275b607ecdf8b32
26stools012b8ad7e9d9b8fd
26stoolsac0844c50baf6a6a
26stools9786b56afcc51c48
26stoolsba5b89de1b6a2e70
26stoolsa4b527cef73ba2a0
26stools848b6bf7fcdc3873
26stoolsabd4aaf670f44209
26stoolse0411540f3175a15
26stoolsd40fbbb7aab06b84
26stools1ed891c44764d630
26stools6210ceaa12f1786a
26stoolsad7375c19e98ceee
26stools11a06bd46611bbee
26stools6cdac236ef958000
26stools4b3e25668a4dec33
26stools725a3932445e911b
26stoolsc9415b0538c9f56c
26stoolsca2ba85981fb77f2
26stools17d13fea72634e47
26stools43b527fb153bca16
26stools8d3a1d9b175903e3
26stools3d70c7c5b2f40b3c
26sprocessscript backend runs setup only
26sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/index.js:15 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…eads the repo tree for a checked-in coverage report (lcov.info, coverage-summary.json, cobertura, clover) and records the parsed %, so a repo that publishes coverage in git shows a number without a crew run or a manual upload. Runs in the …Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/index.js:2 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code…ndpoint:t||r.endpoint||Bt};throw new Error("No AnyForge credentials found. Run `npx @anyforge/control init` to authorise this machine, or set ANYFORGE_API_TOKEN (and optionally ANYF…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/index.js:3 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…tore()}:{},...Gt(e)},...r!==void 0?{body:JSON.stringify(r)}:{}}),u;try{u=await m.json()}catch{throw new f("invalid_response",m.status,`non-JSON response from ${p}`)}if(!m.ok||u.ok===!1)throw Jt(u,m.status);return u.data}function Jt(e,t){le…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈71 tok
1 file · 4 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈97,001 tok
273 tools · 355 per tool
Handshake
9186 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 451

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @anyforge/mcp-server@3.22.0 as of 12 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

mcp-server@3.22.0 safety verdict: Verified — KillerSkills