mcp-server@2.6.12-beta.9
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "MCP server client for UteamUP - enables Claude Desktop/Code integration with automatic OAuth 2.0 authentication" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
- Needs
- UTEAMUP_API_KEY, UTEAMUP_SECRET — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
UTEAMUP_API_KEYUTEAMUP_SECRETUTEAMUP_TOKEN_CACHE_DIRUTEAMUP_TOKEN_REFRESH_MARGINor--test-authConfiguration, not credentials: UTEAMUP_API_BASE_URL, UTEAMUP_DEBUG, UTEAMUP_INSECURE_TLS, UTEAMUP_LOG_FORMAT, UTEAMUP_LOG_LEVEL, UTEAMUP_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES, UTEAMUP_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES, UTEAMUP_MAX_RETRIES, UTEAMUP_MCP_PATH, UTEAMUP_REQUEST_TIMEOUT- Where it talks to
- uteamup.com (its own)
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for UTEAMUP_API_KEY, UTEAMUP_SECRET, UTEAMUP_TOKEN_CACHE_DIR, UTEAMUP_TOKEN_REFRESH_MARGIN and talks to uteamup.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 92/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed (it asks for UTEAMUP_API_KEY, UTEAMUP_SECRET); the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 49 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
npx @uteamup/mcp-serverFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx @uteamup/mcp-serverFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx @uteamup/mcp-server [OPTIONS]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx @uteamup/mcp-server --test-authFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx @uteamup/mcp-server --validate-configFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @uteamup/mcp-server@2.6.12-beta.9 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.