mcp-server@2.0.179
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Superblocks MCP server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
SUPERBLOCKS_API_TOKENSUPERBLOCKS_MCP_AUTH_FILESUPERBLOCKS_MCP_HTTP_TOKENSUPERBLOCKS_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: APP_DATABASES_APPLICATIONS_PATH, SUPERBLOCKS_MCP_PROFILE- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso superblocks.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names superblocks.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SUPERBLOCKS_API_TOKEN, SUPERBLOCKS_MCP_AUTH_FILE, SUPERBLOCKS_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN, SUPERBLOCKS_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 2.0.177
vet-skills diff mcp-server 2.0.177 2.0.179In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 2.0.177 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
2.0.177 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 92/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 49 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
// Non-POSIX systems (Windows) may not support chmodFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts."dev": "tsc --build tsconfig.build.json --watch --preserveWatchOutput",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.