mcp-server@129.5.0
VERIFIEDPublisher claims: "MCP server for agents building and verifying Receiz proof-native applications through the canonical Receiz SDK rails." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
RECEIZ_ACCESS_TOKENRECEIZ_CONNECT_ACCESS_TOKENRECEIZ_MCP_DEVICE_RELAY_CLIENT_SECRETRECEIZ_MCP_DEVICE_RELAY_REFRESH_TOKENRECEIZ_MCP_DEVICE_RELAY_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL, RECEIZ_APPLICATION_ID, RECEIZ_ATTACHMENT_DOWNLOAD_ORIGINS, RECEIZ_ATTACHMENT_LOCAL_ROOTS, RECEIZ_BASE_URL, RECEIZ_DEVICE_TRANSPORT_OWNER_ID, RECEIZ_IDENTITY_CONTEXT_SHARING, RECEIZ_LEGACY_CONNECT_TRANSPORT, RECEIZ_MCP_DEVICE_BOOTSTRAP, RECEIZ_MCP_DEVICE_DIRECTORY, RECEIZ_MCP_DEVICE_RELAY_CLIENT_ID, RECEIZ_MCP_DEVICE_RELAY_DIRECTORY, RECEIZ_MCP_DEVICE_RELAY_URL, RECEIZ_MCP_EXECUTION_PROFILE, RECEIZ_OFFLINE_SEAL_DIRECTORY, RECEIZ_OFFLINE_WORKSPACE, RECEIZ_SUBJECT_CUSTODY_DIR, RECEIZ_SUBJECT_IDENTITY_PASSPHRASE, RECEIZ_SUBJECT_IDENTITY_PATH, RECEIZ_SUBJECT_SNAPSHOT_PATH, RECEIZ_V124_MATERIAL_HOST_MODULE, RECEIZ_V125_PROOF_HOST_MODULE, RECEIZ_V125_TRUST_HOST_MODULE- Where it talks to
- receiz.com (its own)Also windows.net, oaiusercontent.com, chatgpt.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names windows.net, oaiusercontent.com, chatgpt.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects RECEIZ_ACCESS_TOKEN, RECEIZ_CONNECT_ACCESS_TOKEN, RECEIZ_MCP_DEVICE_RELAY_CLIENT_SECRET, RECEIZ_MCP_DEVICE_RELAY_REFRESH_TOKEN, RECEIZ_MCP_DEVICE_RELAY_TOKEN only into requests to receiz.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 129.0.0
vet-skills diff mcp-server 129.0.0 129.5.0In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 129.0.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 28 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
No findings across 14,666 lines in 81 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.