Is mcp-server@1.79.3 safe to install?

mcp-server@1.79.3

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Bitcoin-native MCP server for AI agents: BTC/STX wallets, DeFi yield, sBTC peg, NFTs, and x402 payments." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher aibtc · publishing for 298 daysInstalls 4,925Last detonated 3d ago

$claude mcp add mcp-server -- npx -y @aibtc/mcp-server

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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.

Tested: the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested: server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for: HIRO_API_KEYOPENROUTER_API_KEYPILLAR_API_KEYSPONSOR_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: AIBTC_CAMPAIGN_API_URL, AIBTC_TOOLS, BITFLOW_KEEPER_API_HOST, CLIENT_MNEMONIC, NETWORK, OPENROUTER_MODEL, PILLAR_API_URL, PILLAR_DEFAULT_REFERRAL, PILLAR_POLL_TIMEOUT_MS, SPONSOR_FALLBACK_ENABLED
Where it talks to: aibtc.com, aibtc.dev, aibtc.news (its own)Also hiro.so, openrouter.ai, elsalvadorstakesbtc.com, chainagnostic.org, bitflow.finance, gateway.dev, bitflowapis.finance, ordinals.com, bnsv2.com, pillarbtc.com, coingecko.com, x.com, tenero.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw: no credential files read · no network
What we could not test: server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names hiro.so, openrouter.ai, elsalvadorstakesbtc.com, chainagnostic.org, bitflow.finance, gateway.dev, bitflowapis.finance, ordinals.com, bnsv2.com, pillarbtc.com, coingecko.com, x.com, tenero.io as well as its own vendor. The guard injects HIRO_API_KEY, OPENROUTER_API_KEY, PILLAR_API_KEY, SPONSOR_API_KEY only into requests to aibtc.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets HIRO_API_KEY=aibtc.com,OPENROUTER_API_KEY=aibtc.com,PILLAR_API_KEY=aibtc.com,SPONSOR_API_KEY=aibtc.com -- npx -y @aibtc/mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 14 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations

t+CategoryObserved action

0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle

14sprocessdependency install exit 1 · (Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created) npm error Cannot read properties of null (reading 'edgesOut') npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: /tmp/ks-detonate-wWhzTb/task/home/.npm/_logs/2026-11-11T14_42_39_004Z-debug-0.log

14sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed

14sprocessscript backend runs setup only

14sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH

Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"start": "node --env-file-if-exists=.env dist/index.js",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

HIGH

Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"dev": "tsx --env-file-if-exists=.env src/index.ts",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

MEDIUM

File type combined with upload actiondist/index.js:258 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log("\n👛 Wallet not created: output is not a terminal, and the password and mnemonic");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.

AST07

LOW

Financial transfer languageREADME.md:343 · Financial transfer language — potential advance-fee scam · informational: not an instruction file| `get_btc_address_txs` | Get recent transaction history for a Bitcoin address (last 25 transactions) |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.

AST01

HIGH

Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config/networks.js:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// environment: the server loads the .env of whatever directory the clientFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded

≈63 tok

1 file · 81 in bundle

Tool list per prompt

≈0 tok

0 tools · 0 per tool

Handshake

no reply

launch to tools/list, stdio

Undocumented tools

description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @aibtc/mcp-server@1.79.3 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.