mcp-server@1.5.77
BLOCKED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "MCP server exposing Divi 5 Visual Builder as tools for Claude" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
- Needs
- WP_APP_PASSWORD — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.
What this means for the label: Blocked here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
WP_APP_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: DIVIOPS_CROSS_ENV_PAYLOAD_REF_DIR, DIVIOPS_CROSS_ENV_PAYLOAD_REF_TTL_SECONDS, DIVIOPS_WP_CLI_ALLOW, LOCAL_SITE_ID, WP_CLI_CMD, WP_PATH, WP_URL, WP_USER- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso mysite.local, site.local, source.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Do not connect it. The honeypot or a critical finding blocked this version; the evidence is below.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 1.5.76
vet-skills diff mcp-server 1.5.76 1.5.77In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.5.76 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 10/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: README links to a committed installer; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 47 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
// the kill — surface them verbatim. The killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.https://github.com/oaris-dev/diviops/raw/main/diviops-agent.zipFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.…all items are exported. Note: SCF writes a fixed filename `acf-export-YYYY-MM-DD.json` inside `dir` — two exports on the same day silently overwrite. Copy/rename if you're archiving baselines. Returns the standardized envelope { ok, data?,…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.…PP_PASSWORD=xxxx --env "WP_PATH=/Users/you/Local Sites/your-site/app/public" -- npx -y --package @diviops/mcp-server diviops-mcp. Local site ID is auto-detected from …Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// --filename_format=../../etc/passwd can't escape --dir's scope.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @diviops/mcp-server@1.5.77 as of 33 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
70 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%An override rule (installer_lure) caps this verdict regardless of the score. The first item below has to go before anything else counts.
- README links to a committed installer≈ +9 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim diviops: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.