Skills/npm/mcp-server

mcp-server@1.12.1

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Jasper AI MCP Server" Observed in sandbox: sends data to api.jasper.ai.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher gojasper · publishing for 490 daysInstalls 1,165Last detonated 44 min ago

Coverage

Started with a decoy JASPER_API_KEY; tool list observed. Tool calls with a real credential not tested.
Tested
server startup with a tagged decoy in JASPER_API_KEY · MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · where the decoy credential went · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with a real credential
Needs
JASPER_API_KEY — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
JASPER_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: JASPER_API_BASE
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso jasper.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · contacted api.jasper.ai (undeclared)
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with a real credential

Find out what these hosts are first. In the honeypot it contacted api.jasper.ai, which nothing in the package names as its own. If that is the vendor's service, fine; if you cannot place it, do not connect it.

$vet-skills run --net api.jasper.ai -- npx -y @gojasper/mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 1.11.1

vet-skills diff mcp-server 1.11.1 1.12.1

This version reaches for something 1.11.1 did not: 1 rewritten tool descriptor (search-knowledge-base). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

Rewritten tool descriptors
search-knowledge-base

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 66/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Tool description instructs the agent: instruction addressed to the agent. Summary: sends data to api.jasper.ai.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 47 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
6.8sprocessdependency install exit 0
27sprocessrelaunched with a decoy JASPER_API_KEY (tagged; nothing real)
47snetworkCONNECT tcp://api.jasper.ai:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
47sclaimed9 tools with a decoy JASPER_API_KEY: generate-content, get-jasper-brand-voices, get-jasper-audiences, get-jasper-style-guides, get-jasper-products, search-knowledge-base, upload-attachment, get-jasper-agents, run-jasper-agent
47stoolsf0c0ea31e304a4e7
47stools534ae17b8945c3f3
47stools855795a9e61e53d4
47stools9067792a67df252f
47stoolsb5f09921220e3b95
47stools43fe624ea217df90
47stoolsdd54b59b78eb11fd
47stools52727b5e060388ab
47stools9783fd24aa3fff54
47sprocessscript backend runs setup only
47sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Destructive file system command detecteddist/local/common/tools/runJasperAgent.js:81 · Destructive file system command detected7. Display the output back to the user in a consumable formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/package.json:20 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build:remote": "tsc -p tsconfig.remote.json && shx cp package.json dist/ && shx chmod +x dist/remote/remote/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/package.json:19 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build:local": "tsc -p tsconfig.local.json && shx cp package.json dist/ && shx cp README.md dist/ && shx chmod +x dist/local/local/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:19 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build:local": "tsc -p tsconfig.local.json && shx cp package.json dist/ && shx cp README.md dist/ && shx chmod +x dist/local/local/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:20 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build:remote": "tsc -p tsconfig.remote.json && shx cp package.json dist/ && shx chmod +x dist/remote/remote/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Tool description instructs the agent: instruction addressed to the agentmcp:tools/run-jasper-agent:3 · Instruction aimed at the agent: instruction addressed to the agentWait for this tool call as long as the agent needs to run. Do not stop waiting at 180 seconds. Agent runs often takeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈43 tok
1 file · 63 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈7,022 tok
9 tools · 780 per tool
Handshake
1153 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 1929

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

14 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim gojasper: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim gojasperPropose a patch to the maintainer