Skills/npm/mcp-server

mcp-server@0.9.2

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "MCP server for searching and fetching 6,500+ brand SVGs from thesvg.org" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher thesvg · publishing for 255 daysInstalls 6,522Last detonated 45 min ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server -- npx -y @thesvg/mcp-server
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Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
thesvg.org (its own)Also jsdelivr.net — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it under the guard; read the third-party hosts first. The code names jsdelivr.net as well as its own vendor. The guard pins the network to the hosts the honeypot saw.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @thesvg/mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.9.1

vet-skills diff mcp-server 0.9.1 0.9.2

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.9.1 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 95/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 26 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
5.4sprocessdependency install exit 0
25sclaimed5 tools: search_icons, get_icon, list_variants, get_icon_url, list_categories
25stools42b5e6eab9903f85
25stools99ddf160a5c9d8f0
25stools86043ec4cf23b21b
25stools533568b37cc09895
25stoolscd4f3537a23ed3bd
25sprocessscript backend runs setup only
25sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

No findings across 1,046 lines in 12 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈55 tok
1 file · 12 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈900 tok
5 tools · 180 per tool
Handshake
388 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 166

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.